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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of the paper is to analyse the nominal and real convergence process in Estonia 
drawing on the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) framework. A 15-sectoral breakdown for GDP and a 5-
digit level CPI data disaggregation with over 260 items is used for the period 1993:Q1 to 2002:Q1 
to show that the productivity differential is related to the GDP-deflator relative price of non-
tradable goods in the long-run. Furthermore, the role of regulated prices in the CPI basket is also 
investigated: we show that excluding regulated prices makes it possible to detect a robust 
relationship between productivity and the relative price of market services in CPI. The B-S effect 
could have possibly contributed to CPI by a yearly average of 2% to 3% over the sample period, 
with 1% to 4% at the beginning of the period and 0,5% to 1% in 2000 and 2001. The potential 
long-run impact of the B-S effect in Estonia is estimated to amount to 1%-2% . The analysis of 
the influence of the B-S effect on the inflation differential and the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate against Finland, Sweden, Germany and the UK shows that whereas the inflation 
differential attributable to the B-S effect seems to be higher in the early 1990s, it explains better 
the real appreciation, which has occurred in recent years. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Inflation and real exchange rate have attracted much of the interest of applied economists 
focusing on Central and Eastern European transition economies over the last 15 years. A popular 
explanation for higher inflation resulting in a steady appreciation of the real exchange rate has 
long been the B-S effect. The huge gap persisting in the level of productivity between the 
transition economies and the average of EU member States, the argument goes, allows for 
massive growth in productivity in the transition economies, translated into higher inflation and a 
steady appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, in spite of substantially higher growth in 
productivity, most of the transition economies still considerably lag behind the EU average after 
roughly a decade of transition from plan to market, as revealed in Figure 1. Therefore, according 
to popular belief, higher inflation and real appreciation linked to the B-S effect might prevail until 
the countries catch up with productivity levels in Western Europe. 
 
Figure 1. GDP per capita in euro zone countries and in the transition economies in 2001
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 Source: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
This paper focuses on investigating the real and nominal convergence process in Estonia, the 
most developed Baltic country. It is clear that Estonia is actually no exception to the rule since its 
overall productivity level is far behind that of the selected euro zone countries. A more detailed 
comparison with Estonia’s main trading partner, notably Finland sheds further light on the 
tremendous difference in sectoral productivity differentials. The gap between the open sectors’ 
productivity levels, displayed in Figure 2. below seems to be considerably higher than the 
difference in overall productivity levels.  
 
As a consequence, this huge room for catch-up in the productivity level of the open sector, being 
considered as the main driving force behind productivity convergence invites the question of 
whether the B-S effect has played a role in Estonia’s high inflation and massive real appreciation 
in the past, and opens the door to speculations as to what extent future productivity growth 
might influence price convergence and real appreciation towards EU levels. 
 
                                                             
2 Nominal GDP is first converted at current euro exchange rates and using the purchasing power parity rate 
(purchasing parity standard - PPS)provided by Eurostat. The converted figures are then divided by the number of 
employees in the whole economy. The figures are expressed in percentage of the EU-15 average. 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
2,2
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
G
r
e
e
c
e
S
p
a
i
n
F
r
a
n
c
e
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
U
K
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
.
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
L
a
t
v
i
a
P
o
l
a
n
d
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
GDP per capita in EUR
GDP per capita in PPS2 
Figure 2. Sectoral labour productivity in Estonia compared with its main EU trading 
partners in 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s own calculations 
Note: The same methodology is applied as in Figure 1. Figures are expressed in percentage of productivity 
of the open sector in Germany. We are aware of the fact that comparing productivity levels across countries 
is a very delicate task and therefore one should be cautious when interpreting Figure 2. Converting sectoral 
productivity at PPS has indeed a number of shortcomings, and the use of unit value ratios (UVR) should be 
preferred instead. Nonetheless, UVRs are not available for Estonia. (For more detail on PPS and UVR, see 
e.g. (OECD(1996)) 
 
The roadmap of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 
gives a methodological survey of the existing literature on the B-S effect related to transition 
countries and especially to Estonia. Sections 4 and 5 deal with data construction and provide a 
preliminary overview of the data used in the paper. The basic hypotheses to the B-S model 
presented in Section 2 are then empirically examined in Section 6, followed by Sections 7 and 8 
presenting respectively the econometric approach employed and the results of the econometric 
estimations. Next, efforts are made in Section 9 in assessing the importance of the B-S effect on 
inflation and the real exchange rate. Section 10 finally provides some concluding remarks. 
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II. The Balassa-Samuelson framework 
 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect
3 is originally meant to explain the level of and the changes in the 
real exchange rate of developing countries. In his seminal paper, Balassa (1964) argues that the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) as formalised by Cassel(1916a,b, 1918) is a poor yardstick for the 
level of the real and nominal exchange rates since it usually leads to the conclusion that the 
developing country’s currency vis-à-vis the developed country’s is undervalued. In addition, with 
the economic catching-up, the undervalued currency is likely to experience a trend appreciation in 
the longer run. This definitely discredits PPP. In recent times, however, the B-S model has been 
extensively used for assessing structural inflation patterns. 
 
To begin with, it must be noted that there are some crucial assumptions to be fulfilled for the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (B-S) to be at work. First, the home economy is considered to be 
divided into an open and a closed sector producing respectively tradable and non-tradable goods. 
The second assumption is that because of trade integration, the price of tradable goods is 
expected to be  determined on the international goods markets. Trade integration implies the 
absence of administrative and quantitative trade barriers so that the absolute and relative PPP is 
verified for the traded goods. Consequently, wages in the open sector are linked to the level of 
productivity. Finally, wages are assumed to be approximately the same in the open and the closed 
sectors or at least equalise between them. One factor promoting wages to equalise across sectors 
is labour mobility within the home country. If wages are higher in one sector than in the other, 
workers are expected to exercise pressure on wages in both sectors by moving to the higher-wage 
sector. The other factor providing a possible mechanism for wage equalisation is the degree of 
unionisation of the economy. The higher the union density, the better the wage equalisation. 
 
The level of productivity in the open sector is generally by far lower in the developing country 
compared with the developed one. As prices are exogenous and wages are a function of the level 
of productivity, the wage level which prevails in the developing country’s open sector is also 
much lower than that in the developed country. Due to the wage equalisation process between 
the open and the closed sectors, wages in the closed sector are comparable to those in the open 
sector. As a result, the price level of non-traded goods turns out to be lower than that in the 
foreign economy, which in turn means that the general price level of a developing country is 
below that in a developed country. Let us now consider the definition of the real exchange rate: 
 
PPP E
E
PPP E
1
E
* P P
E
* P 1
P E
P
* P E
Q = ⋅ = = =
⋅
=      (1) 
 
where Q and E denote the real and the nominal exchange rates in foreign currency terms and 
with P and P* being respectively the domestic and foreign price levels. Recalling that the 
exchange rate suggested by PPP is 
* P
P PPP E =  and that E is normally dominated by the price of 
domestic and foreign traded goods, it is easy to see that E
PPP is smaller than 1 and E. This in turn 
implies that Q is larger than unity and thus undervalued according to PPP.  
                                                             
3 It is also common practice to call it the Ricardo-Balassa or the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect. 4 
Graph 1. The B-S effect in levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can now turn to the dynamic version of the B-S model and see how changes in productivity 
influence inflation and finally the real exchange rate. It is true to say that a successful economic 
catch-up process is, in the long run, driven mainly by the manufacturing industry in general and 
by the export sector in particular. It therefore comes as no surprise that the catching-up economy 
usually experiences higher productivity gains in the open than in the closed sector. Hence, higher 
productivity in the open sector means higher wages spilling over to the closed sector through the 
wage equalisation process and thus provoking a rise in the price of non-tradable goods. With PPP 
being respected for tradable goods, the overall CPI will increase via the increase in non-tradable 
prices. The relationship between the change in the productivity differential and the change in 
relative prices can be formally derived using constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
functions for the open and sheltered sectors
4: 
 
()( )
γ − γ
⋅ ⋅ =
1 T T T T K L A Y        ( 2 )
  
 
() ( )
δ − δ
⋅ ⋅ =
1 NT NT NT NT K L A Y        ( 3 )  
 
where  A, L and K stand for total factor productivity (TFP), labour and capital in the open (T)
5 
and the closed (NT) sectors. The following profit functions hold for the two sectors: 
 
 
T T T T T L W K R Y P G ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ =      ( 4 )  
 
 
NT NT NT NT NT L W K R Y P G ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ =       ( 5 )  
 
G, R and W being respectively the profit, the interest rate and the wage. The respective 
substitution of equations (2) and (3) into equations (4) and (5) yields: 
 
  ()( )
T T 1 T T T T T L W K R K L A P G ⋅ − ⋅ − 

 

 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
γ − γ
    (6) 
                                                             
4 In this neo-classical framework, technological progress is exogenous to the economy. This seems to be a reasonable 
hypothesis for transition economies and especially for Estonia, since the major part of advances in technology are 
brought about by foreign direct investments. 
5 Capital is assumed to be mobile across sectors and the domestic and foreign economies, whereas labour is only to 
be mobile within the domestic economy and not across economies.  
Productivity in the open sector is 
higher abroad compared to that in the 
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Profit maximisation implies that the marginal product of capital and labour be equal to the 
interest rate and the wage: 
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Dividing by P both sides of the equation, we obtain: 
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Taking equations (12)-(15) in natural logarithms and normalising prices to P
T (P
T=1)
6  leads to: 
 
  () ( )
T T T l k 1 a ln w − γ − + + γ =        ( 1 6 )  
 
  () ( )
NT NT NT NT l k 1 a ln p w − δ − + + δ + =      ( 1 7 )  
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Totally differentiating equations (16)-(19) leads to:: 
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6 Lower-case letters stand for variables taken in natural logarithms. 6 
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equations (20)-(23) can be simplified to: 
 
  ()
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  ()
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T T m a ⋅ γ =          ( 2 6 )  
 
 
NT T NT p m a − ⋅ δ =         ( 2 7 )  
 
Substituting equation (26) into equation (24), as in equation (28), and inserting it into equation 
(26), leads to equation (29): 
 
  ()
T T T m m 1 m w = ⋅ γ − + ⋅ γ =        ( 2 8 )  
 
γ
=
T a
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We then substitute equation (27) into equation (25) : 
 
 
NT NT NT NT NT m m ) 1 ( p m p w = ⋅ δ − + − ⋅ δ + =    ( 3 0 )  
 
Finally, equation (30) is substituted into equation (25) and (29) is applied to (31) yielding equation 
(33): 
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7 Lower-case letters denote hereafter growth rates expressed in natural logarithm. 7 
Equation (33) is the so-called internal transmission mechanism of the B-S effect between the 
productivity differential and the relative price of non-tradable goods. Put differently, equation 
(33) shows the impact of productivity gains on non-tradable inflation. In practice, the equation 
tested is as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( )
NT T T NT a a f p p − = −        ( 3 3 a )  
Let us now consider the home and the foreign countries at the same time. If the crucial 
assumptions of the model hold and if (33a) can be also verified for the foreign country, the 
increase in the productivity differential and the change in relative prices using equation (34) 
should be related
8: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − − − = − − −
NT T NT T T NT T NT a a a a p p p p      ( 3 4 )  
 
Expressing inflation in terms of tradable and non-tradable prices as in (35) and then substituting 
it into equations (33a) and (34), the inflation rate and the inflation differential due to the B-S 
effect can be easily derived as in (36 ) and (37): 
 
  ()
NT T p 1 p p ⋅ α − + ⋅ α =        ( 3 5 )  
 
  () ( ) NT T T a a 1 p p − ⋅ α − + =         ( 3 6 )  
 
  ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ⋅ α − − − ⋅ α − + − = ∗ −
NT T NT T T T a a 1 a a 1 p p p p     ( 3 7 )  
 
Let us now consider the relationship linking the non-tradable inflation over tradable inflation 
(relative prices) to changes in the CPI-based real exchange rate. The substitution of (35) applied 
to the home and foreign economies into (1’) yields (39): 
 
  p p e q − + =
∗           ( 1 ’ )  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) NT T NT T p 1 p p 1 p e q ⋅ α − + ⋅ α − ⋅ α − + ⋅ α + =
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗      ( 3 8 )  
 
  ( ) ( )
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∗ ∗ ∗ ∗      ( 3 8 a )  
 
with  ( ) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ⋅ α − − = ⋅ α T T T p 1 p p  and  () T T T p 1 p p ⋅ α − + − = ⋅ α −  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) NT T NT T T T p 1 p 1 p 1 p 1 p p e q ⋅ α − − ⋅ α − + ⋅ α − + ⋅ α − − − + = ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗    (38b) 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ⋅ α − = − ⋅ α − − = ⋅ α − + ⋅ α − − T NT NT T NT T p p 1 p p 1 p 1 p 1  (38c) 
 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) T NT NT T NT T p p 1 p p 1 p 1 p 1 − ⋅ α − − = − ⋅ α − = ⋅ α − − ⋅ α −     ( 3 8 d )  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ⋅ α − + − ⋅ α − − − + = T NT T NT T T p p 1 p p 1 p p e q      ( 3 9 )  
 
To sum up, equations (34) and (39) imply that if the productivity differential of the domestic 
economy systematically outpaces that of the foreign country, higher domestic non-tradable 
inflation translated into higher overall inflation over the foreign one will provoke, all things being 
equal, an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
 
III. A methodological overview of the literature on the B-S effect 
 
III. A. The B-S effect in CEECs 
 
                                                             
8 This means that the neo-classical framework should apply for the foreign country as well, e.g. EU countries in this 
paper. However, there is more scope for endogenous technological progress in these countries implying the use of 
some kind of endogenous growth model. 8 
The body of the literature on the B-S effect in Central and Eastern European transition 
economies has been steadily growing in recent years. The thriving number of papers tries to 
answer the question as to whether the B-S effect plays an important role in the transition 
economies and if so, to what extent should policy-makers care about it. In the mid-1990s, the 
general perception in the economic profession was that the B-S effect was at the root of higher 
inflation and the trend appreciation of the CPI-based real exchange rate. However, recent 
research suggests that the B-S effect might not be as strong as believed earlier. 
 
It is clear that differences in the theoretical and empirical approaches employed in the studies 
makes it difficult to directly compare results. In this regard, the question that should be answered 
is what is tested for in the mushrooming papers? The first and the most simple way to test the B-
S effect is to focus on the internal transmission mechanism, that is on the relationship linking the 
productivity differential to the relative price of non-tradable goods in the country under study. In 
this context, the B-S serves for investigating long-term inflation pattern.
9 Furthermore, 
considering the relative price of non-tradable goods as the internal real exchange rate is very 
tempting and is often used to draw general conclusions on developments in the external real 
exchange rate
10. It is, however, clear that this may lead to false conclusions since the internal real 
exchange rate only influences the internal allocation of resources and can describe the external 
position of the home economy to a much lesser extent
 11. Indeed, the external real exchange rate 
defined as the nominal exchange rate corrected with the inflation differential vis-à-vis the foreign 
countries matters for external competitiveness. Hence, for the B-S effect to be a real exchange 
rate determination model suited for policy purposes, the home country’s trading partners should 
also be taken into consideration. In so doing, two ways are open. First, one can directly examine 
the relationship between the difference of the productivity differentials and the CPI-based real 
exchange rate
12. Hence, the external transmission mechanism, i.e. the pass-through from 
productivity differences through the difference in relative prices towards the real exchange rate is 
assumed to be a priori verified. To avoid to run the risk of a spurious relationship, though, it is 
desirable to test separately whether the relative price differential is connected to productivity 
developments and subsequently to have a look at the link between the real exchange rate and the 
relative price differential
13. This simple B-S framework can be extended by including other 
fundamental variables when the so-called fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate is 
estimated
14.  
 
The above described relationships can be investigated using either descriptive statistics, 
sometimes also called the accounting framework or more sophisticated econometrics. One way 
to handle the lack of long time series, a usual problem in transition economics, is to use panel 
estimations
15. The basic assumption behind panel data analysis is the homogeneity of the 
elements in the panel. Put simply, the economies put in the same basket should behave similarly, 
at least in the longer run so that the estimated coefficient reflect a common long-term behaviour 
of all economies. Yet, it is often difficult to accept the homogeneity assumption, which makes 
                                                             
9 See e.g. Backé et al. (2002), Kovács (2001), Simon – Kovács (1998), Rother (2000), Sinn – Reutter (2001), Égert 
(2002a,b,c), Égert et al (2002), Lommatzsch – Tober (2002a), Mihaljek (2002), Nenovsky – Dimitrova (2002) 
10 Cf. Coricelli – Jazbec (2001) and Halpern – Wyplosz (2001) 
11 The internal real exchange rate is suited for economies mainly dominated by the production of raw material and is 
less useful in analysing industrialised countries. 
12 Golinelli – Orsi (2001) 
13 For recent papers, see Égert (2001, 2002a,b,c) and Égert et al. (2002) 
14 For a methodological overview on the fundamental equilibrium real exchange rates, see Égert (2002) and for 
empirical applications to transition economies, see Avallone – Lahrèche-Révil (1999), Begg et al. (1999), De Broeck – 
Slot (2001), Dobrinsky (2001), Égert - Lahrèche-Révil (2002), Fischer (2002), Filipozzi (2000), Frait – Komarek 
(1999), Halpern – Wyplosz (1997) and Randveer –Rell (2002) 
15 Begg et al (1999), Coricelli-Jazbec (2001), De Broeck-Slot (2001), Dobrinsky (2001), Égert et al. (2002), Halpern-
Wyplosz (1997), Halpern-Wyplosz (2001) and Maurin (2001) 9 
these estimations, from a policy point of view, hard to convert and to interpret for individual 
countries. Instead, panel estimation are more appropriate to explain the behaviour of the 
countries viewed as a single region.  
 
A less elegant but still very useful method, and also appropriate for policy purposes, for assessing 
the B-S effect is the descriptive statistical analysis
16, which prevents difficulties with heterogeneity  
across countries and therefore allows to draw policy implications. In addition to descriptive 
statistics, conventional time series techniques can also be employed. On the one hand, it is true 
that they require quarterly
17 or monthly data
18, and that the results may lack power and 
robustness. However, the other side of the coin is that information obtained this way might be 
more valuable for individual countries compared to what one can get from panel studies.
19 
 
Table 1. Studies using the simple B-S framework 
  Hypothesis tested  Link  Countries  Period  Variables 
DESCRIPTIVE STAT          
Backé et al. (2002)  None  1  CZ, H, P, SVN  1992-2000, Y  LB, DEFL 
Kovács (2001)  PPP for tradables  1, 2  H  1991-1999, Y  LB 
Kovács et al. (2002)  None 2  CEEC5 1991/1994-2001  LB 
Kovács - Simon (1998)  PPP for tradables  1, 2  H  1991-1996, Y  LB, DEFL 
Rother (2000)  None  1  SVN, CZ, E, SK  1993/1994-1997/1998, Y and Q  LB, DEFL 
Sinn – Reutter (2001)  None  1  E, H, P, SVN, CZ  1994/1996-1998, Y  LB 
TIME SERIES           
Égert (2002a,b)  PPP for tradables  1, 2, 3  CEEC5  1991/1993–2000, M  LB, rel(CPI), RER(DEM, 
USD, EFF) 
Égert (2002c)  Wage equalisation  1, 2, 3, 4a  CEEC5  1991 – 2001, Q  LB, rel(CPI, PPI), 
RER(DEM, USD, EFF) 
Golinelli – Orsi (2001)  None  4a  H, P, CZ  1991:1/1993:1-2000:7, M  LB, rel (CPI/IPP), 
RER(EUR) 
Jakab – Kovács (1999)  None  1  H  1991-1998, Q  LB, CPPI-based prices in T 
and NT, NEER 
Lommatzsch-Tober 
(2002a) 
None    EE, CZ, H, P, SVN  1994/1995-2001, Q  LB, DEFL 
Mihajlek (2002)  Wage equalisation  1  CZ, CR, H, P, SVN, 
SK 
1993/1996-2001/2002, Q  LB, DEFL 
Nenovsky – Dimitrova 
(2002) 
Wage equalisation  1  BG  1997-2001, M  LB, rel (CPI) 
PANEL          
Halpern – Wyplosz (2001) 
 
Real wages + wage 
equalisation 
1, 4b  CEEC5, B3, RU, RO, 
BG, KY 
1991/1995-1998, Y  LB, GDP per capita, 
rel(CPI) 
Égert et al. (2002)  Real wages + wage 
equalisation + PPP 
1, 2, 3  CEEC5, B3, CR  1995-2000, Q  LB, DEFL, rel(CPI), 
RER(DEM) 
Notes: M, Q and Y indicate the use of monthly, quarterly and yearly data. CEEC5= Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, B3= 
3 Baltic States, BG=Bulgaria, CZ=Czech Republic, CR=Croatia, EE= Estonia, H=Hungary, KY= Kirghizstan, P=Poland, RO=Romania, 
SK=Slovakia, SVN=Slovenia 
Relationships:   1 = prod(T)-prod(NT) => relative prices 
    2 = (prod(T)-prod(NT)) - prod(T)*-prod(NT)* => relative prices home –relative prices abroad 
    3 = relative prices home –relative prices abroad => real exchange rate 
    4a = (prod(T)-prod(NT)) - prod(T)*-prod(NT)* => real exchange rate 
    4b = (prod(T)-prod(NT)) => real exchange rate 
Variables used: LB=average labour productivity, DEFL=relative prices based on GDP deflators, rel(CPI)=relative prices based on CPI data, 
RER(DEM, USD, EFF)= real exchange rate against Germany, the US or the effective trading basket 
                                                             
16 See e.g. Backé et al (2002), Kovács (2001), Kovács (2002), Rother (2000), Simon – Kovács (1998), Sinn – Reutter 
(1998). 
17 Cf. Égert (2002c), Jakab – Kovács (1999), Lommatzsch – Tober (2002), Mihaljek (2002). 
18 The use of high frequency monthly data can provide more powerful results econometrically. However, it is widely 
acknowledged that they do not provide with more economic information on long-term developments. Cf. Égert 
(2001), Égert (2002a, b), Golinelli – Orsi (2001), Nenovsky – Dimitrova (2002) 
19 There is always a compromise to make between econometrically robust results and economic interpretability. 10 
 
Table 2. Studies using the extended B-S framework 
 Countries  Period  Variables 
TIME SERIES      
Avallone- Lahrèche 
(1999) 
H  1985-1996, Q  GDP per capita, TOT, Private and public cons over 
GDP 
Égert-Lahrèche (2003)  CEEC5  1992/1993-2001, Q  REER, LB, Private cons., rel(CPI), CA, TOT, OPEN 
Filipozzi (2000)  E  1993-1999, Q  Prod, CA/GDP, INV, NEER 
Frait-Komarek (1999)  CZ  1992-1999, Q  GDP, TOT, real interest rate, savings 
Randveer –Rell (2002)  E  1994-2001, Q  LB, TOT 
Taylor-Sarno (2001)  CEEC5, B3, BG, RO  1993/1994-1997/1998, 
M 
Real interest rate, trend 
      
PANEL      
Arratibel  et al (2002)  CEEC5, B3, BG, RO  1997-2000  LB, prices for traded and non-traded goods, inflation 
equation 
Begg et al. (1999)  85 countries including 
CEEC5, B3, BG, RU, 
RO 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 
1995 
GDP/capita, OPEN, Public cons., NFA, NFA in 
banking, private credits 
Coricelli-Jazbec (2001)  CEEC5, B3, BG, RO, 
7 FSU 
1990/1995-1998, Y  Prod, private cons. on non-tradables, public cons., 
number of employees in industry and in services, 
structural Reforms 
De Broeck – Slot (2001)  CEEC5, B3, BG, RO, 
FSU, M, OECD 
1991-1998, Y  Prod, OPEN, public deficit, TOT, brent, monetary 
aggregates  
Dobrinsky (2001)  CEEC5, B3, BG, RO  1993-1999, Y  TFP, GDP/capita, public cons., M1 
Fischer (2002)  CEEC5, B3, BG, RO  1993/1994-1999, Y/Q  LB, private and public consumption/GDP, real 
interest rate, real raw material prices 
Halpern-Wyplosz 
(1997) 
CEEC5, BG, RO, 
RU, CR 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990  GDP/capita, enrolment, agriculture/GDP, public 
consumption, inflation 
Kim-Korhonen (2002)  CEEC5  1991-1999, Y  GDP/capita, investment, public consumption, 
openness ratio 
Notes: RU=Russia, TOT=terms of trade, OPEN=openness ratio, CA=current account, NFA=net foreign assets. For other abbreviations, see 
notes in Table 1. 
 
III. B. The B-S effect in Estonia: The lack of empirical studies 
 
Estonia is often included in a larger set of transition economies for which then panel 
econometric estimations are employed. This is the case of Begg et al. (1999), De Broeck and Slot 
(2001) and Dobrinsky (2001) where the impact of the productivity differential on the real 
exchange rate is investigated in the extended version of the B-S model by directly regressing the 
real exchange rate on the productivity differential. Coricelli and Jazbec (2001), also employing 
panel data, analyse the factors that influence the relative price of non-tradables in the home 
country. By means of the panel estimates, they proceed to decompose the rise in relative prices, 
measured by the implicit sectoral GDP deflators and conclude that in the case of Estonia, less 
than half of the increase in the relative price of non-tradable goods can be attributed to the 
productivity differential, as demand side factors also turn out to play an important role. Halpern-
Wyplosz (2001), prior to performing panel estimations, investigate whether one of the basic 
assumption to the B-S model, the wage equalisation process across sectors holds and conclude 
that relative wages are quite stable in Estonia. In a panel context, Égert et al. (2002) also have a 
closer look at two of the hypothesis: real wages seem to be in line with productivity 
developments in the open sector, and the wage equalisation, similar to the findings of Halpern-
Wyplosz (2001), turns out to be roughly fulfilled. Furthermore, they argue that between 1995 and 
2000, the contribution of the B-S effect to inflation amounts to about 1,2% on average and the 
corresponding inflation differential against Germany ranges from 0,3% to 0,5%. This is 
something in a big contrast with Sinn-Reutter (2001) who argue, based on descriptive statistics, 
that the inflation resulting from the B-S effect was on average 4,06% between 1994 and 1998. 
Rother (2000) examines the slightly different period from 1993 to 1997. The yearly 
decomposition of the B-S effect suggests that whereas the B-S effect contributed from 1 to 3% 
to domestic inflation between 1993 and 1995, it negatively affected inflation during 1996 and 
1997. 11 
 
The number of papers using time series econometrics in an attempt to examine the B-S effect in 
Estonia is very limited. One of them, Lommatzsch-Tober (2002a) stick to the simple B-S 
framework and aim at assessing the relationship between the productivity differential and the 
relative price of non-tradable goods computed in terms of implicit sectoral deflators. According 
to the estimation carried out using the Engle-Granger cointegration technique for the period 
1994:Q1 to 2001:Q3, there is a long-term cointegrating vector connecting the two variables with 
a significant coefficient of 1,02 for productivity. In contrast with Lommatzsch and Tober, the 
goal of Filipozzi (2000) and Randveer and Rell (2002) is not to investigate the long-term inflation 
but rather to compare the development of the effective real exchange rate with the estimated 
equilibrium real exchange rate. The estimations performed for the respective periods of 1993:Q2-
1999:Q2 and of 1994:Q1-2000:Q3 yield, in different specifications including a different set of 
macro-variables, a coefficient of 0,2 to 0,4 for the difference between the domestic and the 
effective foreign productivity differentials and the effective real exchange rate. 
 
IV. Data definitions 
 
We proceeded to construct productivity, relative price and real exchange rate series for Estonia 
and for its most important trading partners for the period of 1993:Q1 to 2002:Q1. All series are 
transformed in natural logarithms and are seasonally adjusted if the X-12 ARIMA technique 
detects the presence of seasonality. 
 
The productivity series 
 
First, the productivity differential series are calculated for Estonia. Since sectoral TFP estimates 
are not available, average labour productivity is employed as a proxy by dividing gross real output 
by the number of employees. One of the most difficult and important questions in the empirical 
investigation is how to determine the open and the closed sector. As shown in Table 3., there is 
no beaten path for transition economies. The vast majority of papers use a A6 of ESA 95-like 
disaggregation level, which offers data for agriculture including forestry and fishing, industry 
including mining and energy, construction, services considered mainly as private such as trade, 
transportation and telecommunication and public services such as public administration, health 
and education. At this disaggregation level, industry is considered as the sector producing 
tradable goods. Sometimes agriculture and construction are also included. Nevertheless, more 
often agriculture is excluded from both sides as it can heavily depend on subsidies and 
government interventions. Furthermore, construction is usually treated as a non-tradable sector. 
The uncertainty surrounding these two sectors indicates that they might be borderline cases 
producing tradable goods with a higher non-tradable component. As to the closed sector, it 
normally contains the remaining sectors, i.e. services. However, according to the model described 
earlier, profit maximisation is assumed in both sectors. This would imply the inclusion of only 
market services or market-based non-tradable sectors
20. The only paper dealing with Estonia, 
which follows this approach is that of Lommatzsch-Tober (2002a), whereas the other studies 
consider the remaining categories as the closed sector. Randveer-Rell (2002) use very detailed 
sectoral data and consider, in addition to agriculture and manufacturing, also the hotel and 
transportation sectors as producing tradable goods, while the rest of the economy, including 
mining and construction is treated as non-tradables. 
 
 
 
                                                             
20 Another practical reason for excluding non-market sectors is the uncertainty that surrounds prices (as there are no 
market prices) at which output is measured there. 12 
 
Table 3. Classification of sectors into open and closed sectors in transition economies. 
  Open sector  Closed sector 
Studies including Estonia     
Coricelli-Jazbec (2001)  Industry + construction  Rest, agriculture excluded 
De Broeck – Slot (2001)  Industry + construction  Rest, agriculture excluded 
Égert et al. (2002)  Industry + Agriculture  Rest 
  Industry  Rest, agriculture excluded 
Fischer (2002)  Industry + Agriculture  Rest 
Halpern-Wyplosz (2001)  Manufacturing/Industry  Services, agriculture and construction 
excluded 
Lommatzsch-Tober (2002a)  Industry  Construction, trade, finance 
Randveer-Rell (2002)  Agri, Manuf, Hotels, Transport  Rest (mining) 
Rother (2000)  Manufacturing  Rest, agriculture excluded 
Sinn-Reutter (2001)  Manufacturing+agriculture Construction,  Energy,  Services 
    
Studies excluding Estonia     
Backé et al. (2002)  Manufacturing  Rest 
Dobrinsky (2001)  Whole economy   
Égert (2001,2002a,b,c)  Industry  Rest 
Golinelli-Orsi (2001)  Industry  Rest 
Kovács (2001), Simon-Kovács (1998)  Manufacturing  Services, agriculture and public services 
are excluded 
Mihaljek (2002)  Mining, Manufacturing, Hotels, 
Transport, Storage, Telecom 
Rest, agriculture excluded 
Nenovsky-Dimitrova (2002)  Industry + construction  All services, agriculture excluded 
 
I n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  w e  e m p l o y  v e r y  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  data broken down into 15 sectors, which are 
classified into tradable, market non-tradable and total non-tradable categories including market 
and non-market non-tradables. One selection criterion for the tradable sector is that it has to be 
opened to competition (through privatisation). The other one is that trade arbitrage, the main 
mechanism ensuring PPP to hold in the sector as assumed in the model, should be possible. Two 
clear candidates are agriculture and manufacturing. It must be noted that agriculture, contrary to 
other candidate and EU countries, was purified by a “survival race” triggered by complete 
privatisation and the total disengagement of the State. The tradability of this sector is clearly 
proven by figures shown in Table 4., according to which the average of exported agricultural 
products over total agricultural production is 24,6% between 1993 and 2001. 
 
Table 4. The share of exports in agricultural production 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  AVERAGE
10,41% 14,39% 19,30% 16,55% 25,47% 30,17% 31,83% 35,98% 37,35%  24,60%
Note: General exports of live animals, animals product, vegetable products, animal and vegetable oils and their cleavage, wood and article of woods 
over nominal GDP of agriculture, fishing and forestry. Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from the Statistical Office of Estonia 
(www.stat.ee) 
 
The market non-tradable sector consists of wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, 
financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities. Finally, the energy sector 
(electricity, gas and water supply), mining, public administration and defence, education, health 
and social work and other community, social and personal service activities constitute the non-
market non-tradable sector. The reason why mining is considered as non-market non-tradable 
sector is that first, it is largely dominated by oil-shale production (nearly 100%), a product entirely 
used by the domestic energy industry and second, because of the presence of a single, still 
publicly owned company. The same reasoning applies for the energy sector. Even though the 
electricity industry largely covers domestic consumption, the surplus can be transferred only to 
Russia and Latvia as there is no connection yet to the Western and Nordic electricity network. 
Like in mining, it is a monopolistic, not fully privatised market with few market participants. 13 
 
Classification has proved to be difficult for two sectors. While transportation, storage and 
telecommunication clearly belong to the closed sector, the dominance of market forces is less 
clear cut. On the one hand, the railway system was sold only in 2001, the harbours are still 
publicly owned, and even if private companies are present in urban public transportation, it is 
heavily regulated by local municipalities. Similarly, although 49% of Eesti Telecom has been sold 
in 1991, it remained the only player in the market. On the other hand, storage is completely 
privatised and is a competing market, and the emergence of mobile operators had had a direct 
impact on the fixed-line market. As the position of this sector is rather ambiguous, we 
experimented by considering it first as a market and then as a non-market closed sector. Another 
sector difficult to classify is construction. As private companies dominate the sector, the question 
to be answered is whether it belongs to the open or to the closed sector. From the viewpoint of 
tradability of the end product, it should be a non-tradable sector. However, given developments 
in productivity and prices, it might also be treated as a tradable sector. As shown later on, 
productivity growth has been pretty high over the period under study, while prices have been 
rather flat and real wages have grown in line with productivity gains. One explanation may lie in 
the high share of imported tradable goods used in the sector and the relatively high capital 
intensity. So, we first choose to include construction into the closed sector, then to treat it as a 
traded goods sector and finally not to consider it at all. 
 
Because the classification into open and closed sector bore a number of difficult judgements, we 
calculated a whole set of measures of the productivity differential and the relative price increases. 
We first built the differential between productivity in the open and the market closed sectors and 
then between the open and the closed sector as a whole to figure out the difference the use of the 
latter may bring about. Tables 5-6 summarise the 9 productivity measures calculated. 
 
Table 5. Productivity series used in the paper for Estonia 
  OPEN SECTOR    CLOSED SECTOR 
PROD_T1  A+B+D  PROD_NT_MARKET1  F+G+H+J+K 
PROD_T2  A+B+D+F  PROD_NT_MARKET2  F+G+H+J+K+I 
   PROD_NT_MARKET3  G+H+J+K 
   PROD_NT_MARKET4  G+H+J+K+I 
      
   PROD_NT_TOTAL1  (F+G+H+J+K)+I+(C+E+L+M+N+O) 
   PROD_NT_TOTAL2  (G+H+J+K)+I+(C+E+L+M+N+O) 
Note: A= agriculture, hunting, forestry, B= fishing, C= mining and quarrying, D= manufacturing, E= electricity, gas and water supply, F= 
construction, G= wholesale and retail trade, H= hotels and restaurants, I= transport, storage, telecommunication, J= financial intermediation, K= 
real estate, renting and business activities, L= public administration and defence, compulsory social security, M= education, N= health and social 
work, O= other community, social and personal services activities 
 
Table 6. Productivity differential series for Estonia 
 OPEN  SECTOR  CLOSED  SECTOR 
DIFF_PROD1  PROD_T1 PROD_NT_MARKET1 
DIFF_PROD2  PROD_T1 PROD_NT_MARKET2 
DIFF_PROD3  PROD_T1 PROD_NT_TOTAL1 
DIFF_PROD4  PROD_T1 PROD_NT_MARKET3 
DIFF_PROD5  PROD_T1 PROD_NT_MARKET4 
DIFF_PROD6  PROD_T1 PROD_NT_TOTAL2 
DIFF_PROD7  PROD_T2 PROD_NT_MARKET3 
DIFF_PROD8  PROD_T2 PROD_NT_MARKET4 
DIFF_PROD9  PROD_T2 PROD_NT_TOTAL2 
 
In a next step, we calculate the difference of the productivity differential in Estonia and in a 
benchmark foreign economy so as to see the influence of productivity growth on inflation 
differentials and the real exchange rates. In so doing, we proceed to construct an effective 14 
productivity measure including 4 major trading partners, namely Finland, Sweden, Germany and 
the UK. The reason why we do not consider other FSU countries, e.g. Latvia, Lithuania and 
Russia is that we are basically interested in the catch-up process towards Western European levels 
of development. As can be seen in Table 7, the four EU economies adds up to 50% of total 
Estonian exports and imports. The weights employed when the effective measure is calculated 
correspond to the average share of the four countries in their totalled exports and imports to and 
from Estonia between 1993 to 2001. The respective figures are shown in Table 8. in the column 
“average”. 
 
Table 7. The share of the four benchmark economies in total exports and imports (%) 
 1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Finland  25,5 24,6 27,9 24,9 20,3 21,0 21,3 25,2 21,4 
Germany  9,8 8,6 8,6 8,8 8,3 8,7 8,5 8,3 8,5 
Sweden  9,5 9,8 9,5 9,5 10,8 12,1 13,3 12,4 9,8 
UK  1,5 2,4 2,7 3,4 3,3 3,5 3,3 2,9 3,0 
TOTAL  46,3 45,4 48,6 46,6 42,7 45,4 46,3 48,8 42,7 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on SOE data 
 
Table 8. The share of the four benchmark economies in relative exports and imports (%) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 AVERAGE 
Finland  55,0 54,2 57,4 53,4 47,5 46,4 45,9 51,6 50,2  51,3 
Germany  21,2 18,9 17,6 19,0 19,4 19,2 18,4 17,0 19,8  18,9 
Sweden  20,6 21,5 19,5 20,4 25,4 26,8 28,6 25,4 23,0  23,5 
UK  3,2 5,3 5,5 7,2 7,7 7,7 7,0 6,0 7,0  6,3 
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0  100,0 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on SOE data 
 
The classification of sectors into open and closed sectors roughly follows the approach adopted 
in the case of Estonia. So, based on 15-sector data, we determine the average labour productivity 
for Germany, Finland and Sweden by dividing real output by total hours worked. We note that in 
countries with a high share of part-time workers, it is theoretically more appropriate to use hours 
worked instead of the number of employees
21. The open sector includes mining and 
manufacturing, on the one hand. On the other hand, whilst construction, energy, wholesale and 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and telecommunication, financial 
intermediation and finally real estate, renting and other business activities form the market closed 
sector, agriculture, public administration, education, health and social work and other community, 
social and personal services make up the non-market closed sector. Contrary to Estonia, 
agriculture is treated as a non-market non-tradable sector because of the distorting CAP in the 
EU. Another difference to Estonia is the energy market in general and the electricity market in 
particular. Because of the early liberalisation of these markets, we consider them as market-based 
sectors
22. As to the UK, we only dispose of data on 5 sectors, that is agriculture, industry, 
construction, trade including hotels and restaurant , transport and communication, financial 
services and other service activities. Therefore, as energy makes part of industry, it cannot be 
separated and put into non-tradables. Fortunately enough, the importance of the energy sector is 
negligible, so it won’t have a large impact on the productivity differential. Furthermore, only the 
number of employees is at our disposal in a sectoral breakdown. But, once again, the small weight 
                                                             
21 In Sweden and in Germany, the share of part-time workers is respectively as high as approximately 24% and 15% 
(European Commission(2001)). The corresponding figure for Finland is considerably lower, about 10% . In Estonia, 
the share of part-time workers in total employment is as low as about 7%. Contrary to what could be expected, the 
difference between the two series when using the number of employees and total hours worked turns out to be very 
small for all three countries. 
22 Though, it is clear that they are not completely freed. In fact, because of its very low weight in GDP, whether or 
not the energy sector is classified as market or non-market sector will not change too much. 15 
attributed to the UK in the effective basket makes life easy and will not substantially influence the 
effective measure which is dominated by Finland (with a weight of 50%). Based on results to be 
presented later on, the following differences between the Estonian and the foreign productivity 
differentials are used in the investigation:  
 
Table 9. Productivity differentials for the foreign benchmark 
  OPEN SECTOR  CLOSED SECTOR 
DIFF_PROD1  C+D E+F+G+H+I+J+K 
DIFF_PROD2  C+D REST  excluding  agriculture 
DIFF_PROD3  C+D  REST including agriculture 
Note: see Table 5. 
 
Table 10. The difference in productivity differentials 
 ESTONIE  BENCHMARK 
D_DIFF_PROD1  DIFF_PROD5 DIFF_PROD1 
D_DIFF_PROD2  DIFF_PROD6 DIFF_PROD2 
D_DIFF_PROD3  DIFF_PROD6 DIFF_PROD3 
 
 
The relative price series 
 
The calculation of the relative price of non-tradables relies on both deflator and CPI price 
measures. As a first step, the implicit deflators corresponding to the above described productivity 
series are determined based on nominal and real sectoral GDP. The respective relative prices are 
calculated subtracting the logarithms of the deflator series of the open sector from those of the 
closed sector. The same has been done to obtain the relative price of non-tradable goods for the 
effective foreign benchmark. Finally, the difference between the Estonian and the foreign relative 
prices is calculated as shown in Table 13. However, it must be noted that the overall GDP 
deflator and the calculated deflators for the open and the closed sectors do not coincide with the 
consumer price index. As the CPI inflation is at the heart of economic policy in general and of 
monetary policy in particular, the relative price of non-tradable goods derived from the CPI is 
more appropriate to be used instead. We therefore separated the CPI into different goods and 
service categories. As we have at our disposal monthly time series of the about 260 items 
included in the Estonian CPI, we could construct series for food, non-food goods, market 
services, regulated services, household energy, fuel and finally alcohol and tobacco
23. 
Subsequently, we chose to compute two series approximating the development of non-tradable 
prices. One contains only non-food goods whilst the other also includes food products. It has to 
be mentioned that the two series behave very similarly as the non-food goods and food series run 
very closely to each other. The only difference is the higher non-seasonal short-term disturbances 
in the food series. Next, three series for non-tradable prices are considered. Beside the market 
service prices, a series including both market and regulated services and a third one containing, in 
addition, household energy are computed. Based on these data series, we determine 6 relative 
prices series for Estonia, which are summarised in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. CPI-based relative prices for Estonia 
 NON-TRADABLES  TRADABLES 
REL1  MARKET SERVICES  NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL2  TOTAL SERVICES  NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL3  TOTAL SERVICES + ENERGY  NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL4  MARKET SERVICES  FOOD + NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL5  TOTAL SERVICES  FOOD + NON-FOOD GOODS 
                                                             
23 For the precise definition of each category, see appendix. Alcohol and tobacco and fuel are not considered in the 
analysis as they are very often subject to tax changes and to fluctuations in world oil prices. 16 
REL6  TOTAL SERVICES + ENERGY  FOOD + NON-FOOD GOODS 
 
For the sake of comparability, the same relative prices have to be used for the foreign countries. 
For Sweden, we calculate the same series as for Estonia using a 2-digit level disaggregation for 
CPI prices corresponding to the COICOP. For Finland and Germany, we use 1-digit COICOP 
data. Finally, we use very disaggregated CPI data (with over 75 categories) for the UK obtained 
from the Bank of England. 
 
Table 12. CPI-based relative prices for the foreign countries 
 NON-TRADABLES  TRADABLES 
REL1  MARKET SERVICES  NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL2  MARKET SERVICES  FOOD + NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL3  TOTAL SERVICES  NON-FOOD GOODS 
REL4  TOTAL SERVICES  FOOD + NON-FOOD GOODS 
 
Table 13 The difference in the CPI-based relative prices in Estonia and in the foreign 
countries 
 ESTONIA  BENCHMARK 
D_REL1  REL1 REL1 
D_REL2  REL4 REL2 
D_REL3  REL2 REL3 
D_REL4  REL5 REL4 
 
The real exchange rate series 
 
The nominal exchange rate series are based on average monthly data based on which several real 
exchange rate series are computed. First, the ones based on the official CPI and industrial PPI 
indexes. Then, the real exchange rate based on goods prices including food and without food are 
calculated. Finally, a synthetic CPI index based on consumer goods and market services is 
determined and used for measuring the real exchange rate. 17 
 
V. A preliminary data analysis 
 
Figure 3. presents the labour productivity in absolute values and as normalised to the first period 
for the open sectors, the market-based and non-market non-tradable goods sectors as described 
in the data section. It can be seen that the level of productivity in the open sector is considerably 
lower than that in the closed sector, irrespective of whether it is market or non-market. At the 
same time, productivity in market non-tradables is still well over that in non-market non-
tradables. Furthermore, the data also show that while the rate of growth in the open sector well 
outpaces that of the closed sector, the non-market segment of the closed sector clearly lags 
behind of market non-tradables in terms of productivity growth. Hence, the difference in open 
and closed sector productivities is clearly positive. 
 
Figure 3. Labour productivity in Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When constructing the relative price series, the alcohol&tobacco and the fuel items were 
completely ignored from the CPI because they are all heavily influenced by changes in the excise 
tax and the fuel price is subject to changes in the oil price on the international markets. Figures 4. 
below well demonstrates this effect.  
 
Figure 4. Alcohol&tobacco and fuel prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As to the relative price series, they also show substantial increases over the period under 
investigation. Both using sectoral deflators and disaggregated CPI data, the price of non-tradables 
turns out to increase much faster compared with tradable prices. In addition, the non-market 
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component of non-tradable prices outpaces market non-tradable prices. This is especially the case 
for the CPI-based measures, as regulated prices grow 2,5 times faster than market service prices. 
 
Figure 5. GDP deflators and the CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulated prices have three major components: public transportation, post and 
telecommunication and finally rent for publicly owned housing and housing related communal 
services
24. There are at least four main reasons for huge past (and possible future) increases in 
regulated prices: 
•  First, regulated prices were unchanged at the beginning of the transition period when other 
prices were set free. So, the large increase in regulated prices mirrors the late catch-up with 
other prices, mainly those of services. 
•  As soon as the adjustment process has finished, regulated prices are expected to behave 
similarly and therefore can be considered as normal market services in the long-run. But it is 
not well-known, where is their target value to adjust to. Furthermore, current prices of 
regulated services do not allow yet cost recovery, which implies further increases beyond 
what the B-S effect would imply for normal market services. 
•  Third, the majority of regulated sectors are capital intensive. Prices below cost recovery - 
which do not allow for capital maintenance costs - go in tandem with an ever increasing need 
for capital investments so as to improve quality and to close the gap to constantly improving 
EU standards. Consequently, sooner or later capital investments are to be taken into 
account
25. 
•  Finally, housing prices in general and thus rents included in the CPI in particular cannot be 
directly linked to the B-S effect for the following reasons: 
a.)  Generally, in transition economies, housing prices started adjusting relatively late 
in the second half of the 1990s: the relative price adjustment of housing turns out 
to be a slower and longer process than that for other prices
26. 
                                                             
24 In addition, housing energy turns out to be regulated as well as it exhibits one stepwise increase at the beginning of 
every year. Housing energy is treated separately. 
25 This will come either through additional painful price increases or via considerably improved efficiency. The 
former can be achieved by privatisation and market liberalisation. Nonetheless, the scope for the former is very 
limited due to the difficulty to introduce real competition to, say, the water industry. Efficiency can yet be improved 
under a tight, price cap regulatory regime as the example of the UK has recently shown. (Cf. Saal-Parker(2000), Saal-
Parker(2001)) 
26 See e.g. Valkovszky (2000) for Hungary. 
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b.)  This adjustment process accelerates with increasing household incomes and may 
be accompanied by bubble-like market exuberance. This seems to be also the case 
in Estonia as shown in Figure 6. below. 
c.)  Possible tight supply in housing can reinforce all this. 
d.)  Non-market rents have undergone a big adjustment process. Even so, they are yet 
expected to lag behind market rents. Figure 6. also shows that whilst the major 
hike in rents occurred in 1994-1995, flat prices started rising sharply recently, 
indicating future increases in market rents, and later on in rents for State-owned 
housing. 
 
Figure 6. Regulated rent prices and the price of flats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Bank of Estonia 
Note: The price of flat refers to flats in Tallinn and Tartu, in satisfactory condition: inhabitable, partly 
out of repair, no changes in subdivision plat done, no improvements to the building made, area 54m². 
 
So, as shown in Figure 7. below, the relative price excluding regulated services is substantially 
lower than the one including them. Comparing these series to the relative price of non-tradable 
goods using the official non-tradable and tradable series published by the Bank of Estonia, the 
latter is very similar to the ones with regulated items and excluding household energy. 
 
Figure 7. Relative price measures compared to the official relative price of the Bank of 
Estonia 
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VI. Are the basic assumptions of the model fulfilled? 
 
There are several assumptions to be verified prior to the econometric analysis. The theoretical 
model explicitly assumes perfect capital mobility between Estonia and the outside world, and 
labour mobility within the Estonian economy. The first one is obviously fulfilled with the early 
implementation of the currency board system: not only all capital movements are liberalised, but 
also there are important de facto capital movements to and from Estonia
27. As to the labour 
mobility assumption, it is hard to empirically verify. As it is needed for the wage equalisation to 
hold, we have a closer look at the wage equalisation process. We begin by examining whether the 
transmission from sectoral productivity growth to the increase in the price of non-tradable goods 
is secured. As in equation (12) of the model, the real wage should be linked to the productivity in 
the open sector. Since we are investigating the model in dynamics, it is most important to check 
whether changes in the real wage deflated by tradable prices are related to productivity 
developments. Four different tradable price indexes are employed to calculate changes in the real 
wage in the open sector defined as T1 and T2
28: the corresponding sectoral deflator, the PPI, and 
two CPI sub-indexes, namely non-food price inflation and total goods inflation including food. 
As can be seen in Figure 8., both productivity measures (PROD_T1 and PROD_T2) move very 
closely in line with the deflator and the PPI deflated real wage series. Nevertheless, using goods 
prices from CPI leads to a different conclusion: even though the short-term dynamics seem to 
correspond, the real wage measures grow faster and move steadily away from productivity, with a 
30% positive gap over the whole period (3,33% a year). Indeed, this is not a serious concern 
because productivity in the open sector should be in line with the real wage when prices in the 
same sector and not from the CPI are employed.
29  
 
Figure 8. Productivity and real wages in the open sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 De facto current account convertibility was achieved in 1992. Full current account convertibility in line with article 
VIII of IMF and quasi-total capital account convertibility is completed by 1994. Today, the only restriction 
remaining on capital movements is related to land purchases. 
28 The sectoral nominal wages are weighted using sectoral employment data. 
29 This means actually that the tradable component of CPI has risen more slowly than the PPI. This can happen 
because the two indexes contain different goods. The PPI consists of domestically produced goods, whereas a large 
part of goods in CPI is imported goods. It is difficult to say precisely this share as CPI statistics do not consider the 
origin of the goods. As imported goods in household consumption is of importance and because the CPI should 
broadly reflect household consumption patterns, the share of imported goods should be of a comparable magnitude. 
Furthermore, there is also a mismatch between the characteristics of the goods included in the two price indexes: 
PPI contains more industrial goods while the good component of CPI includes consumer goods and durable 
consumer goods. Bearing all this in mind, developments in export and import prices can explain this phenomenon: 
export prices have risen compared to import prices, which in turn means that the PPI including a great deal of 
exported goods has experienced larger increases than the goods component of the CPI containing a considerable 
amount of imported goods. 
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The second step is now to see to what extent nominal wages do equalise between the open and 
the closed sectors
30. Nominal wages in the open sector seem to be lower than those in both the 
market-based closed sector including transport and communication and the closed sector as a 
whole  (see Figure 9.) - independently whether or not construction is considered. The absolute 
wage equalisation may be slightly better achieved between the open sector and the market-based 
closed sector including transport and communication as the ratio is closer to unity. However, 
looking at relative figures shows, seemingly paradoxically, that the wage ratio may follow a 
downward trend whereas in the two former cases, the ratio turns out to be rather stable. 
 
Figure 9. The wage equalisation process in absolute and relative terms, 1993-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of the individual sectors reveals that this is mainly due to huge wage increases in 
financial intermediation. While wages in other sectors move in line over the period considered, 
wages in financial intermediation, already initially higher, grow by far the fastest. 
 
Figure 10. Average nominal wages in 15 sectors in Estonia, 1993-2001 (EEK) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 The open and closed sectors are defined as for the productivity and the deflator and the equalisation is considered 
for the differences developed for productivity, that is DIFF1 to DIFF9 where data for the open sector is divided by 
that for the closed sector. 
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By eliminating wages in financial intermediation from the closed sector, the ratio turns out to be 
very close to unity. In addition, if transport and telecommunication are taken as a market-based 
non-traded goods sector, the ratio proves to be more stable than in the case when they are 
excluded. So, it is not false to state that wages seem to be ready to transmit the effect of 
productivity growth onto non-tradable prices. However, given the institutional setting in Estonia, 
it remains somewhat unclear how wage equalisation comes about. First, labour mobility across 
sectors is rather unidirectional in Estonia. If the open sector is the leader in wage setting, and if 
wages grow there faster, mobility towards the open sector should be observed. In practice, the 
contrary happened in Estonia. Over the last 10 years, the number of employees has dramatically 
decreased in the open sector while it slightly increased in the market-based non-traded goods 
sector
31. Second, given that union density in Estonia is one of the lowest among transition 
economies
32 and because unions are present mainly in mining and the public sector, trade unions 
cannot promote wages to equalise across the whole economy.  
 
Figure 11. The wage equalisation process in absolute and relative terms, excluding 
financial services, 1993-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. The econometric approach 
 
As the series are constructed with 1993:Q1 being the basis=100, they are expected to be non-
stationary in levels
33. The first thing to do in the econometric analysis is therefore to check the 
order of integration of each single series used in the investigation. The testing strategy proposed 
by Dickey and Pantula (1987) is combined with the strategy suggested in Hurlin (2001). Dickey 
and Pantula argue that testing the null of I(1) against I(0) might lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis even though the series are truly I(2) or I(3) processes. For this reason, it is more 
secure to start by testing higher order of integration and, as the null is rejected, continue to test 
lower order of integration. In line with this technique, we start testing I(3) against I(2). If the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted, we then perform the test for the null of I(2) against I(1), and 
finally the null of I(1) is checked against the alternative of I(0). Given this, the testing strategy as 
in Hurlin (2001) is followed using conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
                                                             
31 The difference is apparently absorbed by the decreased activity rate. 
32 See Paas et al. (2002), pp. 55. 
33 As noted in Nelson and Plosser (1982), 95% of the macroeconomic series contain a unit root in levels. 
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Perron (PP) unit root tests. Let us consider the null of I(1) against the alternative of I(0)
34. In a 
first step, the tests are carried out using the model including a linear trend and a constant. If the 
null is rejected, the significance of the trend can be checked for using the standard t-Student 
distribution. When the trend turns out to be significant, the series is stationary around a linear 
trend (trend stationary). Otherwise, in case the trend is not found to be significant, we have to 
test the model with a constant. On the contrary, if the null of the presence of a unit root is 
accepted, the unit root and the trend have to be jointly tested for using critical values given in 
DF(1981) and PP(1988). If the null of no unit root and no significant trend is rejected, the series 
is I(1) with a linear trend. In other word, it has a trend in first differences. If the null is accepted, 
we tested the wrong model, hence the model containing only a drift should be tested. For the 
model with a drift the same procedure applies. The only difference is that the significance of the 
constant has to be checked. If the constant finally does not turn out to be significant, the model 
without constant and trend is employed.
35  
 
When the series are found to be I(1) in the end, the appropriate econometric tool to use for 
analysing potential relationships among the variables under investigation is the co-integration 
technique. In this paper, the VAR-based Johansen co-integration is used. The optimal lag length 
based on a set of information criteria is chosen and likelihood ratio tests are performed to 
determine whether the I(0) and I(1) components of the model contain a constant or a trend. 
Subsequently, the number of co-integration vectors is checked for employing the Johansen trace 
statistics. When the tests are able to reject the null of no cointegration, the stability of the rank 
and the estimated coefficients is verified using diagnostic tests proposed in Hansen-Johansen 
(1999). For the sake of robust results, there is need for a properly specified VAR model in which 
co-integration is tested for. Therefore, a number of diagnostic tests have to be carried out. It is 
important to ensure that absolute values of the roots of the autoregressive polynomial of the 
VAR be below unity. Otherwise, the AR processes would not be stationary. Then, we have to 
make sure that the chosen lag length ex post ensures the assumption of the absence of serial 
correlation in and normality for the residuals of the VAR. For this purpose, Jarque-Bera and 
Mardia multivariate normality tests and the graphical analysis of correlograms are employed. 
Finally, weak exogeneity and exclusion tests are performed.
36 
 
VIII. Results of the cointegration analysis 
 
The results of the combined strategy of testing for unit roots are shown in Tables 1-3 of 
Appendix 4. and suggest that the series are non-stationary in level and stationary in first 
differences. Notable exceptions are some of the CPI-based relative prices, namely REL2, REL3, 
REL5 and REL6 since it turns out to be difficult to determine their order of integration. Whereas 
in the case of all other series the tests clearly indicate their I(1) nature, results for the 4 mentioned 
series are strikingly contradictory. The ADF test suggests they are TS processes, whilst according 
to the PP test statistics, they are stationary with a drift or difference stationary with a linear trend 
(that is explosive in levels). The tests were performed using lags up to 5, and the image has not 
proven clearer. For this reason, we do not consider these variables for the cointegration 
analysis
37. Using the I(1) series, testing for cointegration is done as follows. First, the relationship 
between the domestic productivity differential and the domestic relative prices is investigated (Cf. 
equation (33a)). If the relative price series are found to bear a long-term relationship with the 
productivity differential series conditioned on the rough fulfilment of the basic assumptions, it 
                                                             
34 This strategy is applied to test I(3) against I(2), and I(2) against I(1). 
35 The whole testing procedure is shown in appendix. 
36 See appendix for the testing strategy. 
37 Actually, tentatively performing some cointegration tests with the necessary diagnostic tests clearly confirm this by 
very bad specifications.  24 
seems a reasonable attempt to verify the extent to which productivity driven inflation brings 
about the real exchange rate to appreciate. In doing so, the difference of the home and the 
foreign productivity differentials and that of the domestic and foreign relative prices are analysed 
(see equation (34)). If the difference in productivity differentials turn out to be connected to the 
difference in relative prices, the relationship between the former and the CPI-deflated real 
exchange rate is examined (Cf. equation (39)). 
 
VIII. A. How strong is the relationship between the productivity differential 
and relative prices in Estonia? 
 
As the first step of the cointegration analysis, the internal transmission mechanism is investigated 
using relative prices based on sectoral GDP deflators. A first glance at results shown in Table 14. 
indicate that the corresponding productivity and relative price measures but one are connected 
with each other. Indeed, the tests were unable to reject the null of no cointegration for PROD3 
and DEFL3. For the other series, a cointegration vector is detected with a statistically significant 
coefficient having the expected sign. That is to say, an increase in the productivity differential 
goes in tandem with an increase in the relative price series. Nevertheless, there are notable 
differences in the coefficients depending on whether the sector “transport, storage and 
telecommunication” is considered as market-determined closed sector or not. When it is 
excluded from market non-tradables, the coefficient is systematically lower, amounting to about 
0,6%, irrespective of how the construction sector is classified. The estimated coefficient of the 
cointegration vector are normalised to the relative price series. By contrast, if the sector in 
question is treated as a market non-tradable sector, the estimated coefficients rise slightly over 1. 
This is also the case when the whole non-tradable sector is taken
38. This far we have only 
analysed whether or not cointegration is found. However, having a closer look at the diagnostic 
tests tells us that only a fraction of these cointegration relationships can be regarded as well 
specified and stable. Even though no major problems are encountered in terms of serial 
correlation and normality, a number of estimated cointegration relationships turn out to be 
unstable over time with not-too-robust coefficients. In addition, a score of VAR models are 
found to have roots higher than 1, which of course invalidates the cointegration relationship
39. 
Therefore, we are left with three correctly specified long-term cointegration relationships, notably 
No. 5, 6 and 8. However, as the coefficients determined for these relationships are very similar, 
we conclude that the productivity differential seems to go together with quasi proportionate 
increases in the deflator-based relative prices. 
                                                             
38 We are mainly interested in the open and the market non-tradable sectors, but for the sake of comparability series 
including the whole closed sector are also used. 
39 We note that the exclusion tests do not exclude any of the variables included into the cointegration space. The 
weak exogeneity tests show that the productivity differentials are systematically weakly exogenous. This means that 
only relative prices adjust to equilibrium in the short run.  25 
 
Table 14. Cointegration tests for the internal transmission mechanism (DEFL, PROD) 
Relationship Model  Lags  H0  trace  1  Beta1  Const Normality   Roots  Stability   
              J-B  Mardia   Param.  Rank
                       
                       
PROD1, DEFL1  M1 4  R=0  15,48*  1*  -0,560   3,896 19,568  NO OK NO 
      R=1  3,52    -15,135   (0,420) (0,002)       
                       
PROD2, DEFL2  M2 1  R=0  24,02*  1*  -1,141  0,204 2,368  7,118  OK OK  ??? 
     R=1  6,43    -10,097  5,513  (0,668)  (0,212)       
                       
PROD3, DEFL3  M2 1  R=0  17,04       2,614  7,766  OK OK NO 
     R=1  4,74       (0,624)  (0,170)       
                       
                       
PROD4, DEFL4  M1 4  R=0  17,02**  1*  -0,644   8,462  8,267  NO  ???  ??? 
      R=1  2,54    -24,769   (0,076) (0,142)       
5                       
PROD5, DEFL5  M2 1  R=0  26,74**  1*  -1,197  0,259 5,484  6,304  OK OK OK 
     R=1  7,47    -10,981  5,756  (0,241)  (0,278)       
                       
PROD6, DEFL6  M2 2  R=0  22,40*  1*  -1,227  0,115 3,180  4,457  OK OK OK 
     R=1  5,82    -17,529  4,107  (6,528)  (0,486)       
                       
                       
PROD7, DEFL7  M1 5  R=0  14,13*  1*  -0,681   7,109  8,554  NO NO NO 
     R=1  1,05    42,561   (0,130)  (0,128)       
                       
PROD8, DEFL8  M2 1  R=0  25,90**  1*  -1,236  0,244 7,656  8,226  OK OK OK 
     R=1  8,09    -10,387  4,784  (0,105)  (0,145)       
                       
PROD9, DEFL9  M1 3  R=0  28,76**  1*  -1,107   2,217  3,659  NO OK OK 
     R=1  1,78    92,250   (0,696)  (0,600)       
                       
Notes: M1, M2 and M3 refer to the models tested for with different deterministic components. M1: no trend and no constant neither in the I(0) 
nor in the I(1) components. M2: neither trend nor constant in the I(0) component and constant in the I(1) component. M3: trend in the I(0) 
component. M4 and M5 including a linear and a quadratic trend in the cointegration relationship are not considered at all since there are no 
theoretical consideration for trends in the long-term relationship. * and ** indicate that the null is rejected at the 5% and the 1% significance 
levels. The estimated cointegrating vector is normalised to the relative prices. The shown coefficients is thus that of the productivity series. 
Normality is accepted if p-values in parenthesis are higher than 0,05. OK under the column “roots” indicates that the roots of the model are 
below one. OK also indicates that the tests accept the stability of the rank and the coefficients of the estimated cointegration vector. 
 
Moving one step ahead, we examine whether changes in the productivity differential are related 
to changes in the CPI-based relative prices. As a matter of fact, productivity differentials and the 
relative price of non-tradable goods including regulated services and household energy cannot be 
cointegrated, because of the statistical nature of the relative price series presented earlier. This is 
also partly demonstrated in Figure 2. of Appendix 2. showing that the relative price of total non-
tradables increases at a much higher pace than the productivity differential. On the other hand 
though, the visual inspection of the data suggests that the “core” relative prices, that is the 
relative price of market non-tradable goods might be in line with the growth of the productivity 
differential. This speculation seems to come true according the results, which can be seen in 
Table 15. below
40. Despite the fact that the diagnostic statistics indicate some problems, we can 
find a score of correctly specified cointegration relationships. All the cointegrating vectors are 
significant and correctly signed. We note, that the estimated coefficients are, in all cases, higher 
compared with those for the deflator-based relative prices. But, they are still rather close to unity 
as they range from 0,9 to 1,6 indicating a close relationship between productivity and the “core” 
relative prices. 
                                                             
40 Only results of the estimations employing the REL4 series are show because estimations using REL1 yields very 
similar results and because the diagnostic tests for the latter are slightly worse. 26 
Table 15. Cointegration tests for the internal transmission mechanism (REL4, PROD) 
Relationship Model  lags  H0  Trace  1  Beta1  const Normality   Roots  Stability  
              J-B  Mardia   Param.  Rank
                      
PROD1, REL4  M1 3  r=0  18,61**  1*  -1,284   4,536  4,651  NO OK OK 
     r=1 0,25    -24,692   (0,338) (0,460)       
                      
PROD2, REL4  M1 4  r=0  30,98**  1*  -1,468   3,957  2,963  OK OK OK 
     r=1 0,10    -50,621   (0,412) (0,706)       
                      
PROD3, REL4  M2 4  r=0  42,18**  1*  -1,347  0,005 6,383  4,118  OK OK OK 
     r=1  7,30    -19,249  0,192  (0,172)  (0,532)       
                      
PROD4, REL4  M1 3  r=0  22,18**  1*  -0,985   3,752  5,196  NO OK OK 
     r=1 0,01    -28,941   (0,441) (0,392)       
                      
PROD5, REL4  M1 4  r=0  28,37**  1*  -1,227   7,208  2,417  OK NO OK 
     r=1 0,67    -45,444   (0,125) (0,789)       
                      
PROD6, REL4  M1 3  r=0  34,18**  1*  -1,649   3,502  2,210  OK OK OK 
     r=1 2,97    -27,949   (0,478) (0,819)       
                      
PROD7, REL4  M1 4  r=0  24,41**  1*  -0,932   5,024  2,669  OK NO OK 
     r=1  0,04    46,621   (0,285)  (0,751)       
                      
PROD8, REL4  M1 3  r=0  18,33**  1*  -1,234   3,810  2,463  OK OK OK 
     r=1 0,14    -23,283   (0,432) (0,782)       
                      
PROD9, REL4  M1 3  r=0  20,68**  1*  -1,214   4,075  2,647  OK OK OK 
     r=1  0,00    31,947   (0,396)  (0,754)       
Notes: As for Table 14. 
 
VIII.B. The difference in productivity differentials, in relative prices and the 
real exchange rate 
 
When investigating the external relationship, let us assume that the B-S effect is also at work 
between relative prices and the productivity differential in the foreign benchmark
41. Again, we 
start by testing the difference in sectoral deflators between the home and the foreign countries 
and the difference in the productivity differentials. The conclusion that can be drawn based on 
results presented in Table 16 hereafter is that it is possible to find long-term cointegrating vectors 
linking the investigated variables. More specifically, we can identify one sound, properly specified 
relationship, notably for the case when only market services are used for both the domestic and 
the foreign benchmark countries. This confirms the finding that the public sectors of the 
countries show differing developments, mainly as regards prices. The significant coefficient of 1,1 
leaves no doubt about that this relationship, in accordance with the theoretical models, is a quasi 
equiproportional one. 
 
Continuing by examining the same relationship using the CPI-based relative price series yields 
different results. According to the well identified cointegrating vectors, the impact of the 
productivity differential on the relative price of non-tradable goods compared to that of the non-
food tradable goods is over 1,7%, while the according coefficient when using food and non-food 
prices for tradables is 2,5%. This difference in coefficients might be led back to the fact that food 
prices grew much slower in the benchmark countries, especially in Finland than non-food prices. 
Moreover, the coefficients considerable higher than unity and at the same time higher than that 
obtained for the deflator-based relative price differential have two explanations. The first one is 
                                                             
41 This hypothesis is not formally tested here, but the raw data analysis tells us that the productivity differentials in 
the four benchmark countries move broadly in line with the deflator-based relative price series. When CPI-based 
relative prices are looked at, the conclusion is somewhat darker. 27 
that prices as measured in CPI and as obtained from deflators differ at least as much as for 
Estonia. Second, the B-S effect seems to have a lower impact on prices in Finland and Sweden 
than in Estonia, as the same productivity increase results in a smaller relative price increase 
abroad than in the home country. The  reason for this should be searched in the basic hypotheses 
of the model, and especially in the real wage – productivity relationship in the open sector. 
 
Finally, coming to the real exchange rate, the ADF and PP integration tests indicate that the 
series used contain a linear trend in first differences (See Table 5 of Appendix 4). Consequently, 
when the CPI-based real exchange rate is regressed on the CPI-based relative price
42, we could 
not find a properly specified cointegrating relationship. Even so, the estimated coefficient is as 
high as 2,2. Combining the coefficient of the relative price – productivity differential and that of 
the relative price and the real exchange rate vectors, a 1% change in the difference of the 
productivity differential causes an appreciation in the real exchange rate  of at least approximately 
3,3%. (1,5*2,2 and a change of 5,5% with 2,5*2,2). These figures are rather high when compared 
with those suggested by the model.  We can find two explanation why the real exchange rate 
appreciates more than proportionally to productivity. First, different weights for different items 
in the CPI might be at the root of it. Second, the PPI-based real exchange rate has also sharply 
appreciated at the beginning of the period under study, moving very closely with the CPI-based 
real exchange rate. Consequently, not only higher non-tradable inflation caused the real 
appreciation but also tradable prices growing faster in Estonia than abroad. 
 
Table 16. Cointegration tests for the external transmission mechanism 
(RER_CPI, DIFFDEFL, DIFFREL, DIFFPROD) 
Relationship Model  lags  H0  Trace  1  Beta1  Const Normality   Roots  Stability  
              J-B  Mardia    Param.  Rank
                      
PROD1, DEFL1  M2 3  r=0  27,47**  1*  -1,103  0,115 3,580  4,072  OK OK OK 
     r=1  5,99    -13,556  8,846  (0,466)  (0,539)       
                      
PROD2, DEFL2  M1 1  r=0  14,79*  1*  -1,335   2,343  2,113  NO OK OK 
     r=1  0,24    -24,722   (0,673)  (0,833)       
                      
PROD3, DEFL3  M1 1  r=0  14,58*  1*  -1,242   2,254  2,070  NO OK NO 
     r=1  0,34    -25,845   (0,689)  (0,839)       
                      
PROD1, REL2  M1 3  r=0  17,50**  1*  -1,765   1,926  5,381  OK OK OK 
     r=1  0,04    -15,429   (0,749)  (0,371)       
                      
PROD1, REL4  M1 2  r=0  12,77*  1*  -2,638   13,444 17,679  NO OK OK 
     r=1  0,19    -20,936   (0,009)  (0,003)       
                      
PROD2, REL2  M1 3  r=0  17,81**  1*  -1,968   2,616  4,838  NO OK OK 
     r=1  0,00    -17,729   (0,624)  (0,436)       
                      
PROD2, REL4  M1 2  r=0  14,35*  1*  -2,497   5,661  2,486  OK OK OK 
     r=1  0,69    -24,243   (0,226)  (0,780)       
                      
PROD3, REL2  M1 3  r=0  17,71**  1*  -1,767   2,438  5,216  OK OK OK 
     r=1  0,00    -19,000   (0,656)  (0,391)       
                      
PROD3, REL4  M1 2  r=0  14,53*  1*  -2,832   2,317  3,559  NO NO OK 
     r=1  0,77    23,600   (0,599)  (0,604)       
                      
REL2, RER2  M1 2  r=0  22,56**  1*  1,548   4,135  4,421  OK OK OK 
     r=1  6,00    0,062   (0,388)  (0,491)       
                      
REL2, RER_CPI  M1 2  r=0  25,21**  1*  2,172   4,358 14,143  NO OK OK 
     r=1  0,01    37,448   (0,360)  (0,015)       
Notes: As for Table 14. 
                                                             
42 The same exercise is not performed between the CPI-deflated real exchange rate and the GDP deflator-based 
relative price series as it would not make too much sense. 28 
IX. Descriptive statistics: A routine exercise 
 
IX. A. Structural inflation in Estonia 
 
Up to now, we have tried to determine whether changes in the relative price of non-tradable 
goods are linked to productivity advances in the traded goods sector. However, the impact of the 
B-S effect on Estonian inflation depends also on the size of the productivity differential and the 
share of non-traded goods in GDP and CPI (cf. equation 36). We therefore proceeded to 
compute  the average yearly increase of the productivity differential for the period under 
consideration. Two measures of productivity growth are used: average annual change in the 
original productivity series 
43 and the long-term trend obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
technique. As we observe a step-like increase in all productivity differentials at the beginning of 
the period under study, in addition to the whole period we also calculated averages for the sub-
periods of 1995-2002 and 1996-2002. Actually, as can been seen in Figure 13. below, the average 
productivity growth for the whole period ranges from 6% to 11%, which is considerably higher 
than in the sub-periods when it amounted to 2% - 6%. The figures also show that the differences 
in productivity growth between different periods are less marked when the long-run trend 
approximated using the HP technique is employed for the calculation. 
 
As the impact of the B-S effect passes through the increase in the price of non-tradable goods, 
we need to know the respective share non-tradables represent in GDP and in the consumer price 
basket. Using the share in GDP for the two market-based non-tradable sectors and the two non-
tradable sectors definition
44 including all non-tradable sectors shows that the share of non-
tradables in Estonian GDP varies from 35% up to 70%, depending on the definition of the 
closed sector. According to the theoretical model, only the market-based closed sectors should be 
taken into account, i.e. when prices are directly linked to wage costs. However, there are good 
reasons to think that the regulated or public non-tradable sectors will similarly behave in the 
long-run because of some spill-over effects from market-driven non-tradable sectors towards the 
rest of the closed sector of the economy. As to the CPI, market-based non-tradable items 
account on average for a mere 12% during the period from 1993 to 2002.  Including also 
regulated services yields an average weight of 23,7% in CPI. An even broader definition of non-
tradables, i.e. taking household energy into consideration, the respective figure rises to 32,5%. In 
order to get an impression on the differences shares of non-tradable goods in the implicit GDP 
deflator and in CPI exhibit, their developments are plotted in the figures below. 
 
Figure 12. The share of non-tradables in GDP and the CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hence, we expect that the B-S effect has a higher impact on the deflator than on the consumer 
price index. 
                                                             
43 Averages are calculated for all 9 productivity measures as in the data section. 
44 NT_MARKET1, NT_MARKET2, NT_TOTAL1, NT_TOTAL2 
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Figure 13. Average productivity growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. The B-S effect when using the share of services as in CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The B-S effect when using the share of services as in CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 14-15 show the average rate of inflation resulting from the B-S effect. As expected, the 
impact of the productivity differential on the consumer price index is considerably lower 
compared with that on the GDP deflator. While the influence of the B-S effect on the CPI can 
be estimated to 0,5% - 2,5%, its contribution to the GDP deflator is much larger with 2% to 6% 
per annum. However, because productivity increases and hence the B-S effect was stronger in the 
beginning of the period under study, it is worth having a look at the annual productivity and B-S 
inflation figures. Therefore, for each year of the investigated period, growth rates of the 
productivity differential are calculated using both the original series and the trend obtained using 
the HP technique. Figures presenting the results obtained for the original series indicate that 
there were two major hikes in productivity growth, namely in 1993 and in 1997. In these years, 
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the productivity differential grew by 20-30% and over 10%, respectively. Consequently, this also 
would mean that the B-S effect should have been higher during these periods compared to the 
rest of the period, both when using the share of services in GDP and in CPI. 
 
Figure 16. Y-o-Y growth of the 9 productivity differentials, 1993-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, as the B-S effect is considered as a long-term phenomenon and given the relatively 
short period under observation, it seems to be more appropriate to analyse the long-term 
component of the series. Figure 17. reveals that, irrespective of the different classifications of the 
sectors into tradable and non-tradable, the trend in the rate of growth of the productivity 
differential has been on a decreasing path since 1994 and seems to be stabilised at the end of the 
period in the band of 1% to 3%. The corresponding figures for the consumer price inflation and 
the GDP deflator are shown below. 
 
Figures 17. Productivity growth and the consumer price index, 1993-2002
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 18. Productivity growth and the GDP deflator, 1993-2002
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
45 Weights for market services, for total services and finally for total services plus household energy are used 
respectively in Figures 17a, b and c in accordance with equation 36 when the price of traded goods (pT) is ignored. 
46 Weights for NT_MARKET2 and NT_TOTAL1 are used, respectively. 
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From the analysis we conclude that the productivity driven inflation in Estonia has been rather 
low during the investigated period. Using the strict model, i.e. weights for market services in CPI, 
we find that while inflation due to the B-S effect peaked in 1994 with about 1%, the structural 
inflation steadily decreased to 0,3 to 0,5% in 2000 and 2001. Taking a broader definition of non-
tradables, the resulting contribution to overall inflation is higher as it ranges between 3% and 4% 
in 1994 and somewhere between 0,5% to 1% at the end of the period.  
 
Looking forward, the impact of productivity driven price increases on the CPI could increase 
again. As we have shown earlier, the share of non-tradables in GDP is at least twice as high as in 
the consumer price basket. In developed EU countries such as Germany and France the structure 
of the CPI is much closer to that of the than in Estonia. So, as the structure of the Estonian 
GDP is very similar to that in the aforementioned countries, we can expect the share of services 
in CPI to rise with the catch-up process.
47 If the share of non-tradables in GDP is seen as a target 
value for the CPI, Figure 18 can provide a general idea on the potential long-term inflation in 
Estonia. Accordingly, all things being equal, it can be placed in a band of 0,5% to 2%.  
 
IX. B. The structural inflation differential vis-à-vis the benchmark countries 
 
We have shown that the productivity differential is strongly related to the relative price of non-
tradables in Estonia when using GDP deflators or market service prices from the CPI. However, 
with the share of non-tradables being rather low in CPI, the overall inflation due to the B-S effect 
seems to be situated between 0,5% and 2,5%. The question this provokes is that of the size of 
the inflation differential driven by productivity gains compared with its main trading partners. 
Similarly to the case of Estonia, we determine the average inflation rate for the benchmark 
countries. The average annual productivity figures depicted in Figure 19. below reveal that the 
average growth in the productivity differential has been rather high in Sweden and Finland, 
whereas productivity advances in Germany and the UK are low. As Finland and Sweden make up 
to 70% of the effective basket, it also exhibits substantial increases, up to 3% p.a. Applying the 
share of services in CPI leads to the estimated size of the B-S effect in those countries. We are 
basically interested in the inflation differential vis-à-vis the four countries taken together and 
against Germany. The effective benchmark is important for Estonia, and Germany is often 
considered as a good proxy for the euro zone.  
 
Figure 19. Average productivity growth in the foreign countries, 1993-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
47 Economic growth and increasing wealth means that a larger variety of goods can be consumed reflected in an 
increased share of services in the CPI basket. 
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According to the cointegration analysis, the difference in the productivity differentials is 
connected to the difference in GDP deflator-based relative prices with a coefficient close to one. 
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient between the difference in productivity differentials and 
the CPI price-based relative price of non-tradable goods, i.e. market services turns out to be close 
to 2. Given that the corresponding coefficient for the Estonian economy is found to be close to 
1, this means that a change in the productivity differential in the foreign countries is to be well 
below 1, i.e. approximately 0,5. In turn, this implies that let’s say a 1% change in productivity 
with a share of services as high as 50% in CPI will bring about 0,25% overall inflation instead of 
0,5%. To find out exactly how are productivity and CPI-based relative prices linked, formal 
econometric tests were carried out. Results shown in Table 17. indicate that the tests were unable 
to reject to null of no cointegration or the estimated coefficients are badly signed and not 
significant for the relationships including the 3 productivity measures and REL2 and REL4
48. We 
then went on examining the linkage between productivity and REL1 and REL3
49 and could 
establish long-run relationships reported in the same table. The coefficients we are interested in 
are, as expected, below unity, namely around 0,6. Although the diagnostic tests are disastrous, this 
might give us some indications as to the coefficient between productivity and REL2 and REL4. 
However, they represent an upper-bound estimation as REL1 and REL3 definitely grow faster 
than REL2 and REL4. The answer for why productivity increases are not fully reflected in the 
relative price of CPI market and total services is provided by wage settings in Sweden and 
Finland. First, real wages lag behind productivity growth in the open sector and second, nominal 
wages rise slower in the closed sector compared with the open sector. 
                                                             
48 With food and non-food goods being tradable. The reason for using these relative price measures is that they 
turned out be working better for Estonia than REL1 and REL3. However, in the case of Estonia, there are no big 
differences in the tradable goods whether or not food is excluded. However, this is definitely not the case for the 
foreign benchmark countries. 
49 Where food items are excluded from the tradable category. 33 
 
Table 17. Cointegration tests for the internal transmission mechanism, effective foreign 
benchmark 
Relationship Model  lags  H0  Trace  1  Beta1  const Normality   Roots  Stability  
              J-B  Mardia   Param.  Rank
                      
PROD1, REL2  M2 1  R=0  27,00**  1  0,045  -0,147 8,574  7,800  NO OK OK 
     R=1  5,05    0,194  -4,323 (0,073)  (0,168)       
                      
PROD1, REL4  M3 2  R=0  9,55       3,469  2,192  OK     
     R=1  1,99       (0,484)  (0,822)       
                      
PROD2, REL2  M2 1  R=0  28,36**  1  0,0001  -0,139 7,548  5,383  OK OK OK 
     R=1  5,04    0,000  -4,483 (0,110)  (0,371)       
                      
PROD2, REL4  M3 2  R=0  11,23       3,383  1,927  NO     
     R=1  2,59       (0,496)  (0,859)       
                      
PROD3, REL2  M2 1  R=0  27,30**  1  0,0004  -0,138 8,119  5,900  OK OK OK 
     R=1  5,02    0,000  -4,313 (0,087)  (0,316)       
                      
PROD3, REL4  M1 3  R=0  34,18**        3,502  2,210  OK     
     R=1  2,97       (0,478)  (0,819)       
                      
PROD1, REL1  M3 2  R=0  24,14**  1*  -0,621   2,936  6,493  NO NO OK 
      R=1  0,84    -16,784   (0,569) (0,261)       
                      
PROD1, REL3  M3 3  R=0  15,16       7,556  5,849  NO     
     R=1  1,23       (0,109)  (0,321)       
                      
PROD2, REL1  M3 2  R=0  25,80**  1*  -0,525   3,227  2,305  NO OK NO 
      R=1  0,37    -18,103   (0,521) (0,806)       
                      
PROD2, REL3  M3 2  R=0  18,56*  1*  -0,792   5,505  0,477  NO OK NO 
      R=1  0,71    -15,231   (0,339) (0,993)       
                      
PROD3, REL1  M3 2  R=0  23,80**  1*  -0,599   2,756  4,101  NO OK NO 
     r=1 0,78    -16,189   (0,599) (0,535)       
                      
PROD3, REL3  M3 3  R=0  16,08*  1*  -0,865   6,412  5,980  NO OK NO 
     r=1 1,42    -14,340   (0,170) (0,308)       
Notes: As for Table 14. 
 
When estimating the foreign structural inflation, we face severe uncertainties. Firstly, as shown by 
the cointegration analysis, changes in productivity might not be linked to relative price 
developments. Second, the coefficients we estimated are not robust. So, we first consider the B-S 
inflation equal to zero in the foreign countries, considering it as a lower bound estimate. Next, 
the inflation rate brought about by the B-S effect if calculated multiplying productivity growth 
rates by the share of both market and total services in CPI and the estimated coefficient linking 
productivity and relative prices. These upper bound are then compared with the estimates 
obtained for Estonia (Cf. Figure 17). 34 
 
Figure 20. The average impact of productivity growth on CPI inflation differentials, 1993-
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. The impact of productivity growth on CPI differentials, 1994:Q1-2002:Q1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 21, the actual influence of the B-S effect on the inflation differential 
varies from 0,3% to 0,8% for the effective benchmark, and from 0,6% to 1,5% for Germany if 
we consider the whole period under study. It is clear that the inflation differential is higher in the 
early years of the period and then steadily declines to 0% for the effective benchmark and to 
0,25% to 0,5% for Germany at the very end of the period. However, assuming once again the 
convergence of non-tradable share’s in CPI towards that in GDP, all things being equal, the 
inflation differential brought about by the B-S effect should range, in the long run, from 0,3% to 
1% for the effective benchmark and from 0,7% to 1,5% for Germany. 
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Figure 22. The potential impact of productivity growth on CPI inflation differentials, 
1994:Q1-2002:Q1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX. C. The appreciation of the real exchange rate 
 
Determining the inflation differential between Estonia and its trading partners enables us to 
assess whether the extent of the appreciation of the real exchange rate is in line with what the B-S 
effect would imply. First, it is worth the bother to have a quick look at the CPI and PPI-based 
real exchange rates vis-à-vis the basket of foreign countries and Germany. According to the 
model, the B-S effect, since it operates through the prices of non-tradable goods, can explain the 
excess appreciation of the CPI-based real exchange rate over the appreciation of the PPI-deflated 
real exchange rate. Therefore, for the B-S model to fully explain the real appreciation of the 
currency, the purchasing power parity should hold for the PPI-deflated real exchange rate. In 
other words, the real exchange rate deflated by tradable goods should be stationary (without a 
trend), i.e. it should have a constant mean and variance over time. As plotted in Figure 23 below, 
the CPI and the PPI-based real exchange rates moved in tandem at the beginning of the period 
under investigation. Hence, this real appreciation could not have been caused by the B-S effect
50. 
However, the visual inspection confirms that after this period, the appreciation of the PPI-based 
real exchange rate slowed down compared with that of the consumer price-based real exchange 
rate, and finally it has stabilised from 1997/1998 onwards, both in effective terms and against the 
German mark. Consequently, there is more scope for the B-S effect in the second half of the 
period under investigation. As noted earlier, both the CPI-based and the PPI-based real exchange 
rates contain a linear trend in first differences. It could mean either that the series are explosive 
or that they collapse very quickly to a certain value. In the case of Estonia, the meaning of this is 
that the exchange rate series converge towards a long-term value. Actually, this is in line with the 
B-S effect and PPP if the PPI-deflated real exchange rates converges faster than the CPI-based 
series so that the gap can be  explained by the B-S effect. In fact, this is probably the case. In 
Figure 23. the gap between the CPI and the PPI-based real exchange rate is depicted. The B-S 
effect, i.e. the inflation differential related to higher productivity growth should actually explain 
this difference, which, as shown in Figure 23, is rather substantial at the beginning with over 
15%, and decreasing to 0% at the end.  
 
                                                             
50 The trend appreciation of the PPI-based real exchange rate of some of the transition countries (Estonia excluded) 
is investigated in Lommatzsch-Tober (2002b). However, the trend appreciation is not really the case of Estonia, 
since the PPI-based real exchange rate does not exhibit a linear trend over time. 
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Figure 23. The CPI and PPI-deflated real exchange rates, 
cumulated and Y-o-Y changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, it must not be forgotten that the official CPIs with the aid of which the real exchange 
rate is calculated have differing weights across countries. This leads to compare apples with 
oranges and pears. In addition, there is the regulated price component of the CPI, which, in the 
case of Estonia largely outpaces other CPI-components and thus brings about an excessive real 
appreciation. Two artificial CPI indexes are constructed, both for Estonia and for its trade 
partners. The first one consists of market service prices and the combined series of food and 
non-food goods, with the share of market services in the original CPI being attributed to services 
and the rest (1-(share of market services)) to traded goods (RER1). The second differs only in the 
weights, since the share of total services in the original CPI is attributed to the market service 
series
51, the rest being considered as the weight for the tradable goods. This method allows us to 
control for regulated prices, fuel, alcohol and tobacco, which are simply not taken into account 
(RER2). However, the problem of differing weights across countries still persists. The weights in 
the newly constructed CPI are therefore normalised to weights used in the Estonian consumer 
price index and so making the CPI-based real exchange rate fully comparable with the inflation 
differential provoked by the B-S effect. (Figure 24.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
51 Assuming that regulated prices behave similarly to market services in the longer run. 
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Figure 24. Differences between the original and the weight and regulated price adjusted 
CPI-based real exchange rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The gap between the real exchange rate constructed using service and good price series on the 
one hand and the combined food and non-food goods price-deflated real exchange
52 rate on the 
other are depicted below with the corresponding changes of the difference in the productivity 
differentials. 
 
We have argued earlier that there is considerable uncertainty as to whether or not the B-S effect 
impacts relative prices and consequently inflation in the foreign countries. Therefore, two cases 
are considered here. In the first case, the B-S effect is set to zero in the foreign countries. This 
means that the inflation differential equals to the productivity-driven inflation in Estonia. In the 
second case, the B-S effect corresponds, in the foreign countries, to the actual productivity 
differential multiplied by the share of non-tradable goods in CPI. The first case, plotted in Figure 
25., is clearly an upper bound estimate whereas the second one, displayed in Figure 26., can be 
considered as a lower bound estimate for the real appreciation associated with the B-S effect. 
 
Figure 25. The Y-o-Y CPI-tradable price gap and the productivity driven inflation 
differential, upper bound estimates
53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
52 For the sake of comprehension, the gap between the CPI and PPI-based real exchange rates is mentioned while 
explaining the B-S effect. For the tradable price component is employed when calculating the relative price of non-
tradable goods – issued from CPI -, the tradable price component of CPI is used for the construction of the traded 
goods price deflated real exchange rate. We note, however, that the PPI and the tradable price deflated real exchange 
rates move roughly in line over the period under investigation. 
53 RER_FNF refers to the real exchange rate deflated using the food and non-food good component of CPI. 
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In Figures 25-26, we can observe that the size of the gap differs, especially in the initial phase, 
whether RER1 or RER2 is employed
54. It turns out that during the first half of the period from 
1/3 up to 100% of the gap computed using RER1 is attributable to the productivity driven 
inflation differential, depending on which share is used for non-tradables (market services or total 
services) and whether the lower or upper bound estimates are taken into account, whereas the 
whole gap seems to be comfortably explained by the B-S effect. The difference when the gap 
calculated based on RER2 is investigated is that at best 1/3 of the gap can be associated during 
the first years of the whole period. Nevertheless, the gap and the B-S effect are found to be more 
in line in the second half of the period. 
 
Figure 26. The CPI-PPI gap and the productivity driven inflation differential,  
lower bound estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
54 This is due to the fact that the share of non-tradable goods in the price index used in RER2 is larger compared 
with that in RER1, which makes RER2 appreciate faster than RER1, thus yielding a higher gap with the tradable 
price-deflated real exchange rate (that is the same in both cases). 
VIS-A-VIS GERMANY
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
1
9
9
4
q
0
1
 
1
9
9
4
q
0
4
 
1
9
9
5
q
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
q
0
2
 
1
9
9
7
q
0
1
 
1
9
9
7
q
0
4
 
1
9
9
8
q
0
3
 
1
9
9
9
q
0
2
 
2
0
0
0
q
0
1
 
2
0
0
0
q
0
4
 
2
0
0
1
q
0
3
 
RER1-RER_FNF RER2-RER_FNF
D_DIFF_PROD1-3, using 
the share of market services in CPI
D_DIFF_PROD1-3, using 
the share of total services in CPI
VIS-A-VIS THE EFFECTIVE 
BENCHMARK
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
1
9
9
4
q
0
1
 
1
9
9
4
q
0
4
 
1
9
9
5
q
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
q
0
2
 
1
9
9
7
q
0
1
 
1
9
9
7
q
0
4
 
1
9
9
8
q
0
3
 
1
9
9
9
q
0
2
 
2
0
0
0
q
0
1
 
2
0
0
0
q
0
4
 
2
0
0
1
q
0
3
 
RER1-RER_FNF  RER2-RER_FNF
D_DIFF_PROD1-3, using 
the share of market services in CPI
D_DIFF_PROD1-3, using 
the share of total services in CPI39 
 
X. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper examined the B-S effect and its influence of the nominal and real convergence in 
Estonia. Based on very disaggregated sectoral GDP and CPI data, the main findings of our 
investigation are as follows: 
 
First, all major assumptions of the B-S model are found to be fulfilled. So, we found, not 
surprisingly, that the productivity differential is linked to the GDP deflator-based relative price of 
non-tradable goods. 
 
Second, the notable difference between the GDP deflator and the CPI has to be emphasised. The 
two series differ not only in their structure, which will have serious consequences later on, but 
also in the developments of their components. One of the most important difference is the share 
of non-tradable goods: the GDP deflator contains at least twice as much non-tradable goods as 
the consumer price index. On the other hand, the CPI is largely dominated by regulated prices 
that increases twice as fast as normal services. As a consequence, the cointegration analysis could 
not establish long-term relationship between the productivity differential and the CPI-based 
relative price of non-tradable including regulated prices. However, controlling for regulated 
prices, i.e. excluding these items allows us to detect a nearly one-to-one relationship between 
productivity and the relative price of market services. 
 
Third, the analysis also revealed the fact that the classification as regards the open and the closed 
sector may influence results: the cointegration analysis suggests that construction and the 
transport, storage and telecommunication sectors do not belong to the open or the non-market 
closed sector, but are rather market-driven non-tradable sectors. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that some sectors behave somewhat differently in Estonia compared with what is usually 
assumed (cf. mining, agriculture etc.) 
 
Fourth, the quantitative analysis indicates that in spite of huge productivity advances in Estonia, 
the impact of the B-S effect has been rather limited on overall inflation between 1993 and 2002. 
The main reason for this is the very low share of market and total services in the CPI basket. We 
established that the average contribution of the B-S effect to overall inflation has been 0,5% to 
2%. Although the productivity driven inflation peaked in 1994 with 4-5%, it has dropped to 0,3% 
to 1% in 2001. Nevertheless, the B-S effect might be amplified in the future due to an increased 
share of services in CPI, all things being equal. Considering the share of non-tradable sectors in 
GDP as a long-term target value for the structure of CPI, we estimated the long-term potential 
inflation of the Estonian Economy to 1%-2%. 
 
Fifth, we could also establish quasi equiproportional relationships between the difference of the 
productivity differential in Estonia and its main Western trading partners, notably Finland, 
Sweden, Germany and the UK and the difference in the implicit GDP deflator-based relative 
price of non-tradable goods. However, the CPI-based relative price differential shows that 
productivity advances in the foreign countries’ open sector are less than proportionally translated 
into service price increases because of the wage setting system. Even so, productivity increases 
are big enough in Finland and Sweden to bring down the B-S related inflation differential from 1-
2% in 1994 to close to zero in 2001. Even though the inflation differential steadily decreases vis-
à-vis Germany, it amounts to 0,2-1% in 2001. This implies that even if the long-term potential 
differential is higher with 0,2-2%, fulfilling the Maastricht criterion on price stability will not be 
hindered by the B-S effect. However, this does not mean that the road will not be rocky. As a 40 
matter of fact, regulated prices had a major impact on overall inflation in the past, and, for a 
number of reasons, will probably continue to do so in the future.  
 
Finally, the actual (and the potential) inflation differentials are also indicating the size of the real 
appreciation of the Estonian kroon, which can be (and is going to be ) justified (in the future) by 
the B-S effect. Firstly, controlling for regulated prices and differing weights in Estonian and 
foreign consumer price indexes while computing the real exchange rate yields significantly lower 
but still high real appreciation compared with what we would obtain using the official CPI 
indices. Secondly, it is important to emphasise that the B-S effect cannot explain but the 
difference between the CPI-based and the PPI-based (or some other tradable price measure 
based) real exchange rate. We show that the B-S effect can account from 10% up to roughly 
100% of the CPI and PPI real exchange rate gap (1-4%) in the beginning of the period and easily 
explains the whole gap at the end (1%), i.e. results are more sensitive to different measurements 
at the beginning. Given that the tradable price-deflated real exchange rate considerably 
appreciated in the early and mid-1990s, the total real appreciation is hardly attributable to the B-S 
effect. On the other hand, the tradable price-based real exchange rate turns out to stop 
appreciating in the second half of the period (which invites speculations that the PPP may hold 
for traded goods). Therefore, the gap between CPI and PPI-based real exchange rates accounts 
for the majority of the total real appreciation, and consequently can be fully associated with 
changes in the productivity differential. More generally, it seems to hold true in the case of 
Estonia that whereas during high inflation periods the B-S effect is not likely to drive real 
exchange rates, it is a very strong candidate  when inflation is brought down to low one-digit 
territories coupled with fixed nominal exchange rates. 41 
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Appendix 1. Data sources 
 
Estonia 
Nominal sectoral GDP: Bank of Estonia 
Real sectoral GDP: Bank of Estonia 
Number of employees: Bank of Estonia 
Average nominal wages: Statistical Office of Estonia, www.stat.ee 
CPI: Statistical Office of Estonia 
PPI: Statistical Office of Estonia 
EEK/EURO: Bank of Estonia 
EEK/DEM: Bank of Estonia 
EEK/FIM: series converted using FIM/DEM obtained from Pacific Exchange Rates 
EEK/SEK: series converted using SEK/DEM obtained from Pacific Exchange Rates 
EEK/GBP: series converted using GBP/DEM obtained from Pacific Exchange Rates 
 
Finland 
Nominal sectoral GDP: Statistical Office of Finland 
Real sectoral GDP: Statistical Office of Finland 
Number of employees: Statistical Office of Finland 
Total compensation: Statistical Office of Finland 
CPI: Statistical Office of Finland 
PPI: Statistical Office of Finland 
 
Germany 
Nominal sectoral GDP: Eurostat 
Real sectoral GDP: Eurostat 
Number of employees: Eurostat 
Total compensation: Eurostat 
CPI: Eurostat and Bundesbank 
PPI: Eurostat and Bundesbank 
 
Sweden 
Nominal sectoral GDP: Statistical Office of Sweden 
Real sectoral GDP: Statistical Office of Sweden 
Number of employees: Statistical Office of Sweden 
Total compensation: Statistical Office of Sweden 
CPI: Statistical Office of Sweden 
PPI: Statistical Office of Sweden 
 
United Kingdom 
Nominal sectoral GDP: Eurostat 
Real sectoral GDP: Eurostat 
Number of employees: Eurostat 
Total compensation: Eurostat 
CPI: Bank of England 
PPI: Bank of England 
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Appendix 2. Data 
Figure 1. Estonia, productivity differentials and GDP deflator-based relative prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Estonia, productivity differentials and CPI price-based relative prices 
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Figure 3. The internal transmission mechanism for Foreign benchmark of 4 countries 
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Figure 4. Differences between Estonia and the foreign benchmark of 4 countries 
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Appendix 3. Testing strategies 
 
Figure 1. Testing strategy for unit roots 
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Figure 3. Likelihood ratio tests 
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Figures 3. Cointegration analysis 
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Appendix 4. Unit root tests 
 
Table 1. Unit root tests for the productivity series, Estonia 
  ADF             PP             
  M3      M2    M1 M3     M2   M1 
  H0  F2  Trend H0  F1  Drift H0  H0  F2  Trend  H0  F1  drift  H0 
D2 PROD1 (3)  -8.46**    -0.82  -8.32**    0.29  -7.77** -20.32**    0.12  -20.36**    -0.04 -20.01** 
D1 PROD1 (3)  -5.27**  -2.11*          -13.20**   -1.07  -11.82**  1.24  -10.47** 
PROD1 (3)  -1.30 1.87    -1.89  3.03    0.47  -3.54  6.36    -1.99  2.48    0.05 
                        
D2 PROD2 (3)  -4.65**   0.00  -4.70**   0.02  -4.42**  -16.02**   0.32  -15.70**    -0.24  -15.31** 
D1 PROD2 (3)  -3.47*   -0.75  -3.38*  1.07  -2.94**  -7.59**  -1.16  -7.20**   1.26  -6.65** 
PROD2 (3)  -1.25 1.45    -1.50  2.70    1.18  -3.98*    2.59*         
                        
D2 PROD3 (3)  -4.88**    -0.03  -4.96**    0.19  -4.98** -16.44**    0.34  -16.08**    -0.21 -15.71** 
D1 PROD3 (3)  -3.60*   -0.47  -3.61*  1.62  -2.82**  -7.93**  -0.93  -7.67**   1.59  -6.78** 
PROD3 (3)  1.25 1.08    -1.08 3.87    1.89  -4.07*    3.03*         
                        
D2 PROD4 (3)  -5.80**    -0.02  -5.93**    0.03  -5.66** -15.01**    0.22  -14.78**    -0.26 -14.37** 
D1 PROD4 (3)  -5.95**   -0.67  -6.01**  2.25*    -7.82**  -1.01  -7.50**  1.43  -6.69** 
PROD4 (3)  -2.23 2.88    -1.33  3.34    1.61  -4.98**    3.51**         
                        
D2 PROD5 (4)  -4.35**    -0.04  -4.37**    -0.06 -4.02** -17.45**    0.39  -17.06**    -0.28 -16.59** 
D1 PROD5 (4)  -4.08*   -1.91  -3.21*  1.52  -2.39*  -8.14**  -1.52  -7.32**   1.55  -6.58** 
PROD5 (4)  -1.81 2.78    -2.02  3.14    0.84  -3.97*    2.41*         
                        
D2 PROD6 (3)  -5.48**    -0.12  -5.77**    0.26  -5.30** -15.72**    0.37  -15.40**    -0.19 -15.06** 
D1 PROD6 (3)  -4.57**   -1.74  -3.88**  2.39*    -8.12**  -1.06  -7.63**  1.74  -6.50** 
PROD6 (3)  -1.61 1.82    -1.38  3.30    1.44  -4.16*    3.07*         
                        
D2 PROD7 (3)  -5.48**   0.14  -5.55**    -0.02  -5.31**  -18.36**   0.25  -17.99**    -0.24  -17.50** 
D1 PROD7 (3)  -6.48**   -1.23  -6.43**  2.55*    -9.36**  -1.22  -8.71**  1.68  -7.54** 
PROD7 (3)  -2.54 4.20    -1.88  4.74    1.65  -5.36*    3.72**         
                        
D2 PROD8 (3)  -5.13**   0.23  -5.14**   0.06  -4.85**  -16.33**   0.37  -15.95**    -0.14  -15.62** 
D1 PROD8 (3)  -4.66**   -1.45  -4.30**  2.21*    -8.46**  -1.19  -7.89**  1.90  -6.69** 
PROD8 (3)  -1.48 2.18    -1.85 5.69*      -4.08*    2.94*         
                        
D2 PROD9 (3)  -5.13**   0.23  -5.14**   0.06  -4.85**  -16.33**   0.37  -15.95**    -0.14  -15.62** 
D1 PROD9 (3)  -4.66**   -1.45  -4.30**  2.21*    -8.46**  -1.19  -7.89**  1.90  -6.69** 
PROD9 (3)  -1.48 2.18    -1.85 5.69*    1.65  -4.08*    2.94*         
Notes: D2 and D1 refer to the series in second and first differences. The number in parenthesis after the name of the series is the lag length 
employed that is determined using the Schwartz information criterion. ADF and PP refer to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron 
unit root tests. M3, M2 and M1 stand for the model including trend and constant, the model containing a constant and finally the model without 
trend and constant. H0 is the null hypothesis for the presence of a unit root, e.g.  0 : 0 H = φ . F2 and F1 denote the joint hypotheses of a unit root 
and a trend, and a unit root and a constant, e.g.  ) c , 0 , 0 ( ) c , t , ( : H
2 F
0 = φ and  ) 0 , 0 ( ) c , ( : H
1 F
0 = φ . Critical values are those provided in Dickey – 
Fuller (1979) and Phillips – Perron (1988). * and ** denote the rejection of the null respectively at the 5% and 1% levels. 52 
 
Table 2. Unit root tests for the deflator series-based relative price series, Estonia 
  ADF             PP             
  M3     M2    M1 M3      M2      M1 
  H0  F2  Trend  H0  F1 drift  H0  H0  F2 Trend  H0  F1 drift  H0 
D2 DEFL1 (1)  -8.80**  -0.00  -8.80**  0.02  -8.53**  -12.44**  -0.01  -12.45**  0.06  -12.25** 
D1 DEFL1 (1)  -5.86**  -0.70  5.75**  1.17  -5.35**  -8.14**  -0.41  -8.11**  0.93  -7.83** 
DEFL1 (1)  -2.11 2.34    -1.44 1.51    0.11  -2.77  3.98    -1.81  2.14    0.11 
                        
D2 DEFL2 (1)  -7.65**  -0.21  -7.64**  0.19  -7.41**  -12.23**   0.03  -12.24**  0.09  -12.05** 
D1 DEFL2 (1)  -5.17**  -0.51  -5.12**  1.44  -4.59**  -11.15**  -0.72  -10.64**  1.32  -9.37** 
DEFL2 (1)  -2.22 2.50    -1.02 1.42    0.55  -2.66  3.65    -1.37  1.94    0.44 
                        
D2 DEFL3 (1)  -7.95**   -0.09  -7.98**  0.12  -7.75**  -10.46**   0.50  -10.42**  -0.19  -10.29** 
D1 DEFL3 (1)  -6.09**  -0.77  -6.02**  1.88  -5.23**  -7.18**  -0.79  -7.10**  1.67  -6.48** 
DEFL3 (1)  -2.14 2.69    -1.52 2.73    0.91  -2.74  4.43    -2.02  4.07    0.34 
                        
D2 DEFL4 (1)  -8.51**   0.04  -8.51**  0.00  -8.25**  -13.14**   0.05  -13.15**  0.03  -12.95** 
D1 DEFL4 (1)  -5.78**  -0.86  -5.64**  1.37  -5.14**  -8.65**  -0.55  -8.61**  1.15  -8.21** 
DEFL4 (1)  -1.86 1.91    -1.41 1.74    0.45  -2.76  4.15    -2.00  2.85    0.29 
                        
D2 DEFL5 (1)  -7.42**   -0.20  -7.41**  0.19  -7.19**  -12.99**   0.10  -13.02**  -0.06  -12.83** 
D1 DEFL5 (1)  -5.09**  -0.61  5.02**  1.61  -4.40**  -8.22**  -0.36  -8.23**  1.52  -7.68** 
DEFL5 (1)  -1.93 1.94    -1.01 1.77    0.86  -2.67  3.85    -1.59  2.74    0.71 
                        
D2 DEFL6 (1)  -8.02**   -0.07  -8.06**  0.12  -7.84**  -9.95**    0.54 -9.91**   -0.21  -9.76** 
D1 DEFL6 (1)  -6.40**  -0.92  -6.29**  1.88  -5.38**  -7.12**  -0.81  -7.06**  1.70  -6.42** 
DEFL6 (1)  -2.12 2.66    -1.52 2.81    1.00  -2.86  5.09    -2.24  4.86    0.94 
                        
D2 DEFL7 (1)  -8.23**    0.07  -8.23**    -0.02 -7.98** -13.85**    0.12  -13.88**    -0.00 -13.68** 
D1 DEFL7 (1)  -5.76**  -0.98  -5.58**  1.54  4.99**  -9.28**  -0.69  -9.27**  1.38  -8.68** 
DEFL7 (1)  -1.67 1.68    -1.43 2.09    0.73  -2.88  4.72    -2.23  3.71    0.53 
                        
D2 DEFL8 (1)  -7.24**  -0.21  -7.24**  0.22  -7.03**  -14.03**   0.19  -14.09**  0.02  -13.89** 
D1 DEFL8 (1)  -5.11**  -0.74  -5.01**  1.84  -4.26  -9.14**  -0.53  -9.15**  1.86  -8.37** 
DEFL8 (1)  -1.62 1.48    -1.06 2.46    1.35  -2.89  4.41    -1.91  3.93    0.95 
                        
D2 DEFL9 (1)  -8.21**   -0.04  -8.27**  0.12  -8.45**  -9.12**    0.56 -9.09**   -0.21  -8.95** 
D1 DEFL9 (1)  -6.99**   1.24  -6.76**  2.74*    -7.19**    -0.82  -7.15**   1.83  -6.45** 
DEFL9 (1)  -2.05 2.47    -1.48 2.98    1.18  -3.19  6.45    -2.58 6.32*     
Notes: As for Table 1. 
 
Table 3. Unit root tests for the CPI-based relative price series, Estonia 
  ADF            PP           
  M3     M2     M1 M3     M2      M1 
  H0 F2  Trend  H0  F1  Drift  H0  H0 F2  Trend  H0  F1  Drift H0 
D2 REL4 (2)  -5.24**    -0.84  -5.11**    -0.05 -4.87** -7.08**    -0.77  -6.97**    0.27  -6.86** 
D1 REL4 (2)  -5.55**  -3.64*          -4.39**   -0.49  -4.37**    1.92  -3.66** 
REL4 (2)  -0.04  3.02   -2.41  10.14**    -0.92  1.23   -1.45  7.28*     
                      
D2 REL5 (3)  -7.37**   1.52  -6.97**    1.91  -5.83**  -6.48**   -0.34  -6.45**    0.06  -6.33** 
D1 REL5 (3)  -2.94 5.10    -2.57  4.67    -2.73* -4.01*    -1.82 -3.46*    -3.35**   
REL5 (3)  -8.03**  2.78*            -1.23  6.04  -3.47*   4.83**  
                      
D2 REL6 (3)  -6.07**    1.28  -5.91**    -1.59 -5.06** -6.76**    -0.25  -6.74**    0.00  -6.61** 
D1 REL6 (3)  -2.81 4.27    -2.14  3.10    -2.14* -3.91*    -2.07*         
REL6 (3)  -6.21**    2.59*         -1.21  7.38*        
Notes: As for Table 1. 53 
 
 
Table 4. Unit root tests for the differences in productivity differentials, relative prices and 
for the real exchange rate against the foreign benchmark 
  ADF             PP             
  M3    M2     M1  M3    M2    M1 
  H0 F2  Trend  H0 F1  drift  H0  H0  F2  Trend  H0  F1  Drift  H0 
D2 DIFFPROD1 (1)  -6.20**   0.57  -6.14**   -0.19  -5.95**  -12.14**   0.49  -12.04**  -0.25  -11.85** 
D1 DIFFPROD1 (1)  -4.48**    -0.93  -4.35**   0.72  -4.14**  -6.98**  -1.37  -6.65**  1.02  -6.37** 
DIFFPROD1 (1)  -2.57  4.52   -2.93  4.99   0.20  -2.82  5.42    -3.21  6.08*   0.11 
                        
D2 DIFFPROD2 (1)  -7.36**   0.63  -7.30**   -0.09  7.07**  -10.04**    0.49  -9.97**    -0.19  -9.80** 
D1 DIFFPROD2 (1)  -5.23**    -0.69  -5.18**   1.03  -4.84**  -6.37**  -0.77  -6.28**  1.04  -6.00** 
DIFFPROD2 (1)  -2.48  3.46   -2.23  3.14   0.31  -2.87  4.92    -2.78  4.90   0.32 
                        
D2 DIFFPROD3 (1)  -7.27**   0.62  -7.22**    -0.09  -6.99**  -9.92**   0.49  -9.85**  -0.19  -9.69** 
D1 DIFFPROD3 (1)  -5.19**    -0.75  -5.13**   1.16  -4.74**  -6.28**  -0.81  -6.18**  1.16  -5.86** 
DIFFPROD3 (1)  -2.41  3.32   -2.15  3.12   0.43  -2.78  4.71    -2.68  4.89   0.44 
                        
D2 DIFFDEFL1 (1)  -6.92**   -0.25  -6.92**   0.11  -6.71**  -12.70**   0.05  -12.72**  -0.01  -12.53** 
D1 DIFFDEFL1 (1)  -4.64**    -0.65  -4.56**   0.59  -4.36**  -7.71**  -0.49  -7.69**  0.53  -7.54** 
DIFFDEFL1 (1)  -1.84  1.84   -1.50  1.28   -0.18  -2.46  3.42    -2.16  2.64  -0.27 
                        
D2 DIFFDEFL2 (1)  -7.56**    -0.14  -7.60**   0.06  -7.39**  -9.87**   0.46  -9.85**  -0.24  -9.69** 
D1 DIFFDEFL2 (1)  -5.82**    -0.92  5.70**   0.87  -5.40**  -6.79**  -0.88  -6.70**  0.82  -6.49** 
DIFFDEFL2 (1)  -2.02  2.52   -1.93  2.25   0.14  -2.66  4.58    -2.70  4.41   0.12 
                        
D2 DIFFDEFL3 (1)  -7.55**    -0.14  -7.59**   0.06  -7.38**  -9.89**   0.46  -9.86**  -0.23  -9.71** 
D1 DIFFDEFL3 (1)  -5.78**    -0.92  -5.66**   0.91  -5.35**  -6.78**  -0.89  -6.68**  0.84  -6.47** 
DIFFDEFL3 (1)  -1.90  2.45   -1.90  2.23   0.17  -2.62  4.47    -2.67  4.35   0.15 
                        
D2 DIFFREL1 (1)  -10.59**   -1.51  -10.15**   0.55  -9.81**  -7.12**    -0.36  -7.11**    -0.15  -7.01** 
D1 DIFFREL1 (1)  -6.36**  -2.48*          -5.02**    -0.96  -4.88**    -2.14  -4.05** 
DIFFREL1 (1)  -1.10  1.12   -1.30  3.39   1.25  -1.02  2.01    -1.96  8.21**     
                        
D2 DIFFREL2 (1)  -8.11**    -1.24  -7.84**   0.46  -7.57**  -6.95**  -0.59  -6.93**  0.27  -6.82** 
D1 DIFFREL2 (1)  -5.76**    -1.78  -5.23**    3.13**  -4.54**  -0.35  -4.53**  1.86  -3.86** 
DIFFREL2 (1)  -1.99  2.06   -0.80  2.21   1.09  -1.18  1.20    -1.25  5.63*    
                        
D2 DIFFREL3 (1)  -8.35**    -0.71  -8.25**   0.12  -8.00**  -6.24**  -0.17  -6.23**  0.02  -6.14** 
D1 DIFFREL3 (1)  -6.23**  -3.33*          -4.52**    -1.84  -3.92**    1.55  -3.39** 
DIFFREL3 (1)  -2.15  4.40   -2.86  5.67*     -1.75  5.39  2.35  10.35**     
                        
D2 DIFFREL4 (1)  -8.22**    -0.76  -8.11**   0.08  -7.86**  -5.97**  -0.28  -5.96**  0.07  -5.88** 
D1 DIFFREL4 (1)  -6.45**    -3.52**        -4.31**   -1.75  -3.76**  1.57  -3.21** 
DIFFREL4 (1)  -2.05  3.69   -2.63  5.03   0.59  -1.52  4.64   -2.04*  9.98**     
                        
D2 RERCPI2 (2)  -4.26**    -1.10  -4.37**   1.06  -3.95**  -9.01**  -0.66  -8.81**  0.83  -8.41** 
D1 RERCPI2 (2)  -2.33  3.24   -2.12  2.86  2.22*  -3.54  6.26    -2.03  2.18  -1.77 
RERCPI2 (2)  -3.24 7.20*            -3.41 28.86**           
                        
D2 RERCPI4 (2)  -5.80**    -1.52  -5.44**   1.41  -4.82**  -7.53**  -0.47  -7.46**  0.67  -7.18** 
D1 RERCPI4 (2)  -2.26  2.74   -1.70  1.79   -1.75  -3.25  5.27    -1.87  1.86  -1.67 
RERCPI4 (2)  -4.04*  0.01  -4.69**    -4.48**   -3.35  28.78**          
                        
D2 RERPPI (2)  -6.64**    -1.15  -6.43**   1.41  -5.76**  -8.15**  -0.13  -8.13**  0.44  -7.85** 
D1 RERPPI (2)  -2.78  3.98   -1.68  1.81   -6.27**  -4.67**  -3.33*        
RERPPI (2)  -4.27*  0.20  -6.33**    6.27**   -2.56  28.13**          
Notes: As for Table 1. 
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Table 5. Unit root tests for the productivity differential and the relative prices, 
foreign benchmark 
  ADF             PP             
  M3     M2      M1 M3     M2      M1 
  H0 F2  Trend  H0  F1  drift H0  H0 F2  Trend  H0  F1  Drift  H0 
D2 PROD1 (1)  -9.32**    0.09 -9.32**    -0.37  -9.01**  -11.98**   -0.01  -11.98**    -0.18  -11.78** 
D1 PROD1 (1)  -5.26**   -0.74  -5.16**  2.13  -4.22**  -7.47**   -0.73  -7.37**    2.09  -6.51** 
PROD1 (1)  -2.68 3.94    -1.47  3.54    1.26  -3.23 5.69    -1.77  4.33    1.19 
                         
D2 PROD2 (1)  -8.54**    0.21 -8.54**    -0.39  8.25**  -11.78**   -0.08  -11.78**    -0.14  -11.59** 
D1 PROD2 (1)  -5.08**   -0.98  -4.90**  2.32  -3.81**  -7.34**   -0.89  -7.19**    2.38  -6.14** 
PROD2 (1)  -2.81 4.48    -1.56  4.42    1.45  -3.27 5.69    -1.80  5.34*     
                         
D2 PROD3 (1)  -8.68**    0.23 -8.67**    -0.38  -8.37**  -11.52**   -0.07  -11.52**    -0.13  -11.33** 
D1 PROD3 (1)  -5.19**   -0.84  -5.05**  2.13  -4.10**  -7.26**   -0.75  -7.16**    2.08  -6.32** 
PROD3 (1)  -2.68 3.95    -1.49  3.54    1.23  -3.14 5.40    -1.76  4.34    1.19 
                         
D2 DEFL1 (1)  -5.57**   0.21 5.56**    0.20  -5.38**  -7.81**   0.15  -7.81**    0.21  -7.68** 
D1 DEFL1 (1)  -4.31*  0.63  -4.23**  2.04  -3.33**  -4.69**   0.60  -4.62**    1.89  -3.93** 
DEFL1 (1)  -3.11 5.08    -0.22  1.92    -1.29  -2.45 3.39    0.08  2.69    1.81 
                         
D2 DEFL2 (1)  -5.39**   0.21  -5.38**    0.19  -5.21**  -8.07**   0.16  -8.06**    0.19  -7.93** 
D1 DEFL2 (1)  -4.07*  -0.72  3.97**  2.12  -2.98**  -4.67**   0.67  -4.58**    2.09  -3.73** 
DEFL2 (1)  -2.94 4.64    -0.03  2.33    1.53  -2.36 3.26    0.28  3.64    2.18* 
                         
D2 DEFL3 (1)  -5.20**   0.21  -5.19**    0.19  -5.02**  -8.91**   0.18  -8.90**    0.18  -8.76** 
D1 DEFL3 (1)  -3.81*  0.74  -3.70*   1.93  -2.85**  -4.93**   0.71  -4.83**    2.08  -3.99** 
DEFL3 (1)  -2.68 3.94    0.00  2.31    1.55  -2.26 3.04    0.27  3.37    2.10* 
                         
D2 REL1 (1)  -7.12**   -0.59  -7.06**  0.32  -6.83**  -13.41**   -0.40  -13.30**    0.28  -13.09** 
D1 REL1 (1)  -4.34*  2.04  -3.55*   2.78*    -7.77**    -3.07*         
REL1 (1)  -3.03 11.08
** 
         -1.99  6.09    2.03  17.76**     
                         
D2 REL2 (1)  -6.38**   -0.69  -6.31**  -0.38  -6.09**  -10.30**   -0.44  -10.25**    -0.40  -10.07** 
D1 REL2 (1)  -3.11  4.96   -2.74  3.85  -2.24*  -4.99**    -1.26  -4.69**    2.04  -3.89** 
REL2 (1)  -0.92 1.32    -1.50  3.50    1.08  -1.01 2.46    -2.16  8.85**     
                         
D2 REL3 (1)  -6.63**   -0.51  -6.59**  0.55  -6.33**  -8.82**   -0.38  -8.78**    0.47  -8.60** 
D1 REL3 (1)  -4.60**  2.30*  -3.61*    3.04*    -5.04**  -2.69*         
REL3 (1)  -3.39 10.77
** 
         -2.82  11.44
** 
       
                         
D2 REL4 (3)  -4.47**   -1.31  -3.98**  -0.24  -3.71**  -10.52**   -0.64  -10.12**    -0.33  -9.93** 
D1 REL4 (3)  -4.59**  -3.00*          -4.54**  -0.98  -4.40**    2.80*   
REL4 (3)  -1.94 3.57    -1.92  3.25    -0.12  -0.98 1.31    -1.40*  16.09**     
Notes: As for Table 1. 
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Appendix 5. Diagnostic tests for the cointegration analysis 
 
Table 1. Estonia, internal, deflators versus productivity 
 Weak  exogeneity  Exclusion Roots  LR  test 
  χ2 (p-value)  χ2 (p-value) Number               Root              Absolute value  χ2 (DGF, p-value)
Prod1 – Defl1  8,33(0,004) 
0,01 (0,944) 
7,40 (0,007) 
8,37 (0,003) 
1      (    1.02053,   -0.00000)       1.02053 
2      (    0.74313,    0.34276)       0.81837 
3      (    0.74313,   -0.34276)       0.81837 
4      (   -0.47307,   -0.64452)       0.79950 
5      (   -0.47307,    0.64452)       0.79950 
6      (    0.22180,   -0.74680)       0.77904 
M1       17,92 (4, 0,001)
11,25 (3, 0,010)
8,66 (2, 0,013)
3,592 (1, 0,058)
Prod2- Defl2  1,12 (0,290) 
7,54 (0,006) 
10,34(0,001) 
10,44 (0,001) 
1      (    0.90744,    0.00000)       0.90744 
2      (    0.41668,    0.00000)       0.41668 
M2        3.99 (3, 0,262)
2,88 (2, 0,237)
2,79 (1, 0,094)
Prod3 – Defl3      1      (    0.93904,    0.00000)       0.93904 
2      (    0.51981,   -0.00000)       0.51981 
3      (   -0.11200,    0.17802)       0.21032 
4      (   -0.11200,   -0.17802)       0.21032 
M2        3.64 (3, 0,303)
3,04 (2, 0,219)
2,49 (1, 0,114)
Prod4 – Defl4  11,64(0,000) 
1,32 (0,250) 
9,41 (0,002) 
10,90 (0,000) 
1      (    1.02029,    0.00000)       1.02029 
2      (   -0.46684,   -0.58827)       0.75100 
3      (   -0.46684,    0.58827)       0.75100 
4      (    0.63063,   -0.27692)       0.68875 
5      (    0.63063,    0.27692)       0.68875 
6      (    0.15868,   -0.62704)       0.64681 
7      (    0.15868,    0.62704)       0.64681 
8      (   -0.58764,   -0.00000)       0.58764 
M1       24,54 (4, 0,000)
16,63 (3, 0,001)
6,93 (2, 0,031)
5,88 (1, 0,015)
Prod5 – Defl5  0,16 (0,652) 
10,00(0,002) 
18,59(0,000) 
17,76 (0,002) 
1      (    0.90516,    0.00000)       0.90516 
2      (    0.41811,    0.00000)       0.41811 
M2        4.89 (3, 0,180)
3,14 (2, 0,208)
3,06 (1, 0,078)
Prod6 – Defl6  1,35 (0,246) 
7,35 (0,007) 
14,74(0,000) 
14,79 (0,000) 
1      (    0.93872,   -0.00000)       0.93872 
2      (    0.27225,    0.00000)       0.27225 
3      (   -0.03242,   -0.19488)       0.19755 
4      (   -0.03242,    0.19488)       0.19755 
M2        4.52 (3, 0,211)
3,66 (2, 0,160)
3,29 (1, 0,070)
Prod7 – Defl7  10,53 (0,001) 
0,02 (0,887) 
12,15(0,000) 
11,94(0,000) 
1      (    1.01697,    0.00000)       1.01697 
2      (   -0.89345,    0.00000)       0.89345 
3      (   -0.11951,   -0.85515)       0.86347 
4      (   -0.11951,    0.85515)       0.86347 
5      (   -0.53483,    0.60536)       0.80778 
6      (   -0.53483,   -0.60536)       0.80778 
7      (    0.72650,   -0.00000)       0.72650 
8      (    0.59088,    0.00000)       0.59088 
9      (    0.38643,    0.41161)       0.56458 
10      (    0.38643,   -0.41161)       0.56458 
M1       23,52 (4, 0,000)
16,34 (3, 0,001)
14,42(2, 0,001)
13,28 (1, 0,000)
Prod8- Defl8  1,92 (0,989) 
9,14 (0,003) 
16,23(0,000) 
16,84(0,000) 
1      (    0.90185,    0.00000)       0.90185 
2      (    0.40234,    0.00000)       0.40234 
M2        6.27 (3, 0,099)
4,05 (2, 0,132)
3,28 (1, 0,070)
Prod9 – Defl9  10,53 (0,001) 
0,02 (0,887) 
12,15(0,000) 
11,94(0,000) 
1      (    1.02285,    0.00000)       1.02285 
2      (    0.21439,    0.71790)       0.74923 
3      (    0.21439,   -0.71790)       0.74923 
4      (   -0.48813,    0.42900)       0.64985 
5      (   -0.48813,   -0.42900)       0.64985 
6      (    0.63403,    0.00000)       0.63403 
M1       11,80 (4, 0,019)
8,43 (3, 0,038)
8,42 (2, 0,015)
1,66 (1, 0,197)
Notes: The first statistics for weak exogeneity and long-run exclusion stand for the deflator variable, while figures underneath below refer to 
statistics related to the variable productivity.  56 
Table 2. Estonia, internal transmission from CPI relative prices to productivity 
 Weak  exogeneity  Exclusion Roots  LR  test 
  χ2 (p-value)  χ2 (p-value) Number               Root              Absolute value  χ2 (DGF, p-value)
Prod1 – Rel4  16,55 (0,000) 
0,08 (0,775) 
13,31(0,000) 
16,26(0,000) 
1      (    1.01488,    0.00000)       1.01488 
2      (    0.87685,    0.00000)       0.87685 
3      (    0.42075,    0.57224)       0.71027 
4      (    0.42075,   -0.57224)       0.71027 
5      (   -0.15108,    0.46707)       0.49089 
6      (   -0.15108,   -0.46707)       0.49089 
M1       11,80 (4, 0,019)
4,48 (3, 0,213)
4,06 (2, 0,132)
0,89 (1, 0,345)
Prod2- Rel4  22,83(0,000) 
0,05 (0,818) 
27,96(0,000) 
30,18 (0,000) 
1      (    0.97261,   -0.01345)       0.97270 
2      (    0.97261,    0.01345)       0.97270 
3      (    0.08323,   -0.68616)       0.69119 
4      (    0.08323,    0.68616)       0.69119 
5      (    0.44313,   -0.50281)       0.67021 
6      (    0.44313,    0.50281)       0.67021 
7      (   -0.51810,    0.28900)       0.59326 
8      (   -0.51810,   -0.28900)       0.59326 
M1       11,41 (4, 0,022)
0,88 (3, 0,829)
0,58 (2, 0,748)
0,10 (1, 0,750)
Prod3 – Rel4  19,83(0,000) 
0,00 (0,972) 
33,17(0,000) 
34,56 (0,000) 
1      (    0.93637,   -0.00000)       0.93637 
2      (    0.53973,    0.49623)       0.73318 
3      (    0.53973,   -0.49623)       0.73318 
4      (   -0.43897,    0.45591)       0.63289 
5      (   -0.43897,   -0.45591)       0.63289 
6      (    0.02918,    0.55201)       0.55278 
7      (    0.02918,   -0.55201)       0.55278 
8      (    0.48587,    0.00000)       0.48587 
M2        9,52 (3, 0,023)
3,31 (2, 0,191)
1,07 (1, 0,300)
Prod4 – Rel4  21,99(0,000) 
0,39 (0,530) 
16,85 (0,000) 
20,15 (0,000) 
1      (    1.00432,    0.00000)       1.00432 
2      (    0.94530,   -0.00000)       0.94530 
3      (    0.40194,   -0.60846)       0.72923 
4      (    0.40194,    0.60846)       0.72923 
5      (   -0.26889,    0.49248)       0.56110 
6      (   -0.26889,   -0.49248)       0.56110 
M1       19,96 (4, 0,001)
11,11 (3, 0,011)
10,55 (2, 0,005)
1,58 (1, 0,209)
Prod5 – Rel4  11,42(0,000) 
9,83(0,002) 
26,70(0,000) 
28,22 (0,002) 
1      (    0.98957,   -0.03967)       0.99037 
2      (    0.98957,    0.03967)       0.99037 
3      (    0.45849,    0.53351)       0.70345 
4      (    0.45849,   -0.53351)       0.70345 
5      (    0.07514,   -0.68976)       0.69384 
6      (    0.07514,    0.68976)       0.69384 
7      (   -0.59995,    0.21245)       0.63646 
8      (   -0.59995,   -0.21245)       0.63646 
M1       17,49 (4, 0,002)
2,19 (3, 0,535)
1,69(2, 0,429)
0,67 (1, 0,414)
Prod6 – Rel4  11,42(0,000) 
9,83(0,002) 
26,70(0,000) 
28,22 (0,002) 
1      (    0.95518,    0.00000)       0.95518 
2      (    0.36347,    0.37540)       0.52253 
3      (    0.36347,   -0.37540)       0.52253 
4      (   -0.04355,    0.00000)       0.04355 
M3        4,67 (2, 0,096)
2,56 (1, 0,110)
Prod7 – Rel4  24,32 (0,000) 
2,19 (0,139) 
22,22(0,000) 
23,82(0,000) 
1      (    0.99069,    0.00000)       0.99069 
2      (    0.96207,    0.00000)       0.96207 
3      (   -0.07578,    0.76613)       0.76987 
4      (   -0.07578,   -0.76613)       0.76987 
5      (   -0.63622,    0.00000)       0.63622 
6      (    0.36551,    0.51767)       0.63370 
7      (    0.36551,   -0.51767)       0.63370 
8      (   -0.27497,   -0.00000)       0.27497 
M1       15,98 (4, 0,033)
3,64 (3, 0,303)
2,49(2, 0,288)
2,08 (1, 0,150)
Prod8- Rel4  16,62(0,000) 
0,00 (0,987) 
12,13(0,000) 
15,53(0,000) 
1      (    0.98679,    0.02725)       0.98716 
2      (    0.98679,   -0.02725)       0.98716 
3      (    0.33352,    0.63255)       0.71509 
4      (    0.33352,   -0.63255)       0.71509 
5      (   -0.51009,    0.00000)       0.51009 
6      (    0.02164,    0.00000)       0.02164 
M1       10,98 (4, 0,008)
7,75 (3, 0,051)
7,42(2, 0,025)
2,17 (1, 0,141)
Prod9 – Rel4  20,67 (0,000) 
1,76 (0,185) 
18,89(0,000) 
16,18(0,000) 
1      (    0.99810,   -0.00000)       0.99810 
2      (    0.96705,   -0.00000)       0.96705 
3      (    0.35549,   -0.63413)       0.72697 
4      (    0.35549,    0.63413)       0.72697 
5      (   -0.25773,   -0.50091)       0.56332 
6      (   -0.25773,    0.50091)       0.56332 
M1       16,66 (4, 0,002)
9,63 (3, 0,022)
9,01 (2, 0,011)
2,49 (1, 0,114)
Notes: The first statistics for weak exogeneity and long-run exclusion stand for the CPI-based relative price series, while figures underneath refer to 
statistics related to the variable productivity.  
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Table 3. Estonia, external transmission between differences in productivity differentials, 
relative prices and he real exchange rate against the foreign benchmark 
  Weak exogeneity  Exclusion Roots  LR test 
  χ2 (p-value)  χ2 (p-value) Number               Root              Absolute value  χ2 (DGF, p-value)
D_Prod1 – D_Defl1  6,07 (0,017) 
2,49 (0,114) 
21,16(0,000) 
21,43(0,000) 
1      (    0.72705,    0.09972)       0.73386 
2      (    0.72705,   -0.09972)       0.73386 
3      (    0.32934,    0.58188)       0.66862 
4      (    0.32934,   -0.58188)       0.66862 
5      (   -0.56422,   -0.28762)       0.63330 
6      (   -0.56422,    0.28762)       0.63330 
M2        5,390(3, 0,145)
4,07 (2, 0,131)
0,73 (1, 0,394)
D_Prod2- D_Defl2  4,45(0,035) 
4,54 (0,033) 
14,08(0,000) 
14,29 (0,000) 
1      (    1.01100,    0.00000)       1.01100 
2      (    0.32659,    0.00000)       0.32659 
M1       5,54 (4, 0,236)
2,99 (3, 0,393)
2,88 (2, 0,236)
0,84 (1, 0,360)
D_Prod3- D_Defl3  4,67(0,030) 
3,63 (0,056) 
13,89(0,000) 
13,64 (0,000) 
1      (    1.01250,    0.00000)       1.01250 
2      (    0.33488,    0.00000)       0.33488 
M1       5,49 (4, 0,689)
2,91 (3, 0,406)
2,91 (2, 0,234)
0,52 (1, 0,469)
D_Prod1- D_Rel2  13,44(0,000) 
1,11 (0,297) 
9,04 (0,002) 
14,32 (0,000) 
1      (    0.97550,   -0.00730)       0.97553 
2      (    0.97550,    0.00730)       0.97553 
3      (    0.28445,   -0.63091)       0.69206 
4      (    0.28445,    0.63091)       0.69206 
5      (   -0.42293,    0.00000)       0.42293 
6      (    0.14866,    0.00000)       0.14866 
M1       15,19 (4, 0,004)
11,55 (3, 0,009)
4,93 (2, 0,085)
0,89 (1, 0,345)
D_Prod1- D_Rel4  9,74(0,002) 
3,09(0,078) 
11,14(0,000) 
12,16 (0,002) 
1      (    1.01021,    0.00000)       1.01021 
2      (    0.65767,    0.00000)       0.65767 
3      (    0.26415,   -0.27565)       0.38178 
4      (    0.26415,    0.27565)       0.38178 
M1       16,39 (4, 0,024)
12,31(3, 0,006)
2,49(2, 0,244)
0,59 (1, 0,420)
D_Prod2- D_Rel2  13,86(0,000) 
0,29(0,586) 
10,85(0,000) 
15,26 (0,002) 
1      (    1.00293,   -0.00000)       1.00293 
2      (    0.93382,    0.00000)       0.93382 
3      (    0.30833,   -0.62811)       0.69971 
4      (    0.30833,    0.62811)       0.69971 
5      (   -0.12147,   -0.35602)       0.37618 
6      (   -0.12147,    0.35602)       0.37618 
M1       11,51 (4, 0,021)
8,85 (3, 0,031)
2,45 (2, 0,294)
0,04 (1, 0,848)
D_Prod2- D_Rel4  4,16 (0,041) 
7,41 (0,006) 
8,11(0,004) 
9,36(0,002) 
1      (    1.00000,    0.00000)       1.00000 
2      (    0.48889,    0.48187)       0.68645 
3      (    0.48889,   -0.48187)       0.68645 
4      (   -0.00103,    0.00000)       0.00103 
M1       9,89 (4, 0,042)
5,14 (3, 0,162)
3,19(2, 0,203)
0,75 (1, 0,386)
D_Prod3- D_Rel2  14,35(0,000) 
0,15 (0,701) 
11,19(0,000) 
15,23(0,000) 
1      (    1.00286,    0.00000)       1.00286 
2      (    0.93598,    0.00000)       0.93598 
3      (    0.30403,   -0.62797)       0.69769 
4      (    0.30403,    0.62797)       0.69769 
5      (   -0.11325,   -0.35083)       0.36866 
6      (   -0.11325,    0.35083)       0.36866 
M1       10,96 (4, 0,027)
8,31 (3, 0,040)
2,54(2, 0,281)
0,06 (1, 0,809)
D_Prod3- D_Rel4  8,08 (0,004) 
4,81 (0,028) 
12,94(0,000) 
12,29(0,000) 
1      (    1.01676,   -0.00000)       1.01676 
2      (    0.42408,   -0.36193)       0.55753 
3      (    0.42408,    0.36193)       0.55753 
4      (    0.44707,    0.00000)       0.44707 
M1       9,52 (4, 0,049)
4,85 (3, 0,183)
3,39 (2, 0,183)
0,91 (1, 0,341)
D_Rel2 – RER_CPI  0,313(0,576) 
23,77(0,000) 
24,37(0,000) 
22,58(0,000) 
1      (    1.00491,    0.00000)       1.00491 
2      (    0.89163,    0.00000)       0.89163 
3      (    0.35997,    0.16767)       0.39710 
4      (    0.35997,   -0.16767)       0.39710 
M1      23,75 (4, 0,000)
11,83(3, 0,008)
8,01 (2, 0,018)
3,91 (1, 0,048)
Notes: The first statistics for weak exogeneity and long-run exclusion stand for the CPI-based relative price differential between Estonia and the 
foreign benchmark, while figures underneath refer to statistics related to the difference in productivity differentials.  
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Table 4. Foreign benchmark (including 4 countries), internal transmission from 
productivity to relative prices 
 Weak  exogeneity  Exclusion Roots  LR  test 
  χ2 (p-value)  χ2 (p-value) Number               Root              Absolute value  χ2 (DGF, p-value)
Prod1 – Rel1  15,92 (0,000) 
5,16 (0,023) 
11,93 (0,000) 
18,30 (0,000) 
1      (    1.01713,   -0.00000)       1.01713 
2      (    0.37615,    0.00000)       0.37615 
3      (   -0.32251,    0.00000)       0.32251 
4      (    0.13754,   -0.00000)       0.13754 
M3        4,31 (2, 0,116)
3,32 (1, 0,069)
Prod1- Rel3      1      (    1.01873,    0.00000)       1.01873 
2      (    0.42658,   -0.00000)       0.42658 
3      (    0.07064,   -0.06565)       0.09644 
4      (    0.07064,    0.06565)       0.09644 
M3        2,10 (2, 0,343)
0,51 (1, 0,454)
Prod2 – Rel1  19,05 (0,000) 
4,58 (0,032) 
13,67 (0,000) 
20,61 (0,000) 
1      (    1.01146,    0.00000)       1.01146 
2      (    0.48456,    0.00000)       0.48456 
3      (   -0.35859,    0.00000)       0.35859 
4      (    0.09300,    0.00000)       0.09300 
M3        1,53 (2, 0,467)
0,75 (1, 0,385)
Prod2 – Rel3  9,93 (0,001) 
7,95 (0,005) 
9,72 (0,000) 
14,53 (0,000) 
1      (    1.00000,    0.00000)       1.00000 
2      (    0.60606,   -0.00000)       0.60606 
3      (   -0.03952,    0.09293)       0.10098 
4      (   -0.03952,   -0.09293)       0.10098 
M3        3,12 (2, 0,210)
2,42 (1, 0,120)
Prod3 – Rel1  16,30 (0,000) 
5,34 (0,020) 
11,76(0,000) 
18,26 (0,000) 
1      (    1.01613,   -0.00000)       1.01613 
2      (   -0.33288,   -0.00000)       0.33288 
3      (    0.32663,   -0.00000)       0.32663 
4      (    0.23756,    0.00000)       0.23756 
M3        3,86 (2, 0,145)
2,89 (1, 0,089)
Prod3 – Rel3  2,17 (0,140) 
12,17 (0,000) 
8,49 (0,004) 
14,73 (0,000) 
1      (    1.00000,   -0.00000)       1.00000 
2      (    0.53929,   -0.09349)       0.54733 
3      (    0.53929,    0.09349)       0.54733 
4      (    0.07090,    0.51283)       0.51771 
5      (    0.07090,   -0.51283)       0.51771 
6      (   -0.51447,    0.00000)       0.51447 
M3        7,74 (2, 0,021)
7,15 (1, 0,007)
      
Prod1 – Rel2  12,81 (0,000) 
3,92 (0,047) 
0,84 (0,350) 
0,01 (0,340) 
 
1      (    0.95218,    0.00000)       0.95218 
2      (    0.73854,    0.00000)       0.73854 
M2        11,89 (3, 0,008)
6,29 (2, 0,043)
0,07 (1, 0,787))
Prod1- Rel4      1      (    0.98037,    0.00000)       0.98037 
2      (    0.49731,   -0.11430)       0.51028 
3      (    0.49731,    0.11430)       0.51028 
4      (   -0.11327,   -0.00000)       0.11327 
M3        2,23 (2, 0,327)
0,32 (1, 0,572)
Prod2 – Rel2      1      (    0.95284,    0.00000)       0.95284 
2      (    0.73788,    0.00000)       0.73788 
M2      11. 81 (3, 0,008)
5,87 (2, 0,053)
0,161 (1, 0,688)
Prod2 – Rel4      1      (    0.97880,    0.00000)       0.97880 
2      (    0.49655,   -0.20851)       0.53855 
3      (    0.49655,    0.20851)       0.53855 
4      (   -0.12991,   -0.00000)       0.12991 
M3       3,64 (2, 0,162)
1,03 (1, 0,309)
Prod3 – Rel2      1      (    0.95225,    0.00000)       0.95225 
2      (    0.74077,    0.00000)       0.74077 
M2      11. 07 (3, 0,011)
5,35 (2, 0,069)
0,122 (1, 0,727)
Prod3 – Rel4      1      (    0.97861,    0.00000)       0.97861 
2      (    0.64662,    0.00000)       0.64662 
M3       5,75 (2, 0,056)
1,43 (1, 0,231)
Notes: The first statistics for weak exogeneity and long-run exclusion stand for the CPI-based relative price series, while figures underneath refer to 
statistics related to the variable productivity.  